Daily Report

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Cuba

Delegation Leaves for U.S. To Sign Agreement

Risquet Leading Group

FL2012194588 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] The Cuban delegation that will attend the signing of the agreements to resolve the conflict in southwest Africa left this morning for New York. Here is our reporter (Fritz Suarez Silva) with more information from Jose Marti International Airport.

Hope. Perhaps that is the word that best describes the feelings of political observers from around the world. We are only a few hours away from the time when Cuba, Angola, and South Africa will sign the agreements in New York that may finally solve the conflict in southwest Africa.

In May 1988, the first meeting of these negotiations took place in London. This process continued for several months with meetings in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and Brazzaville throughout various rounds of negotiations.

The Cuban delegation is headed by Comrade Jorge Risquet Valdes, PCC Politburo member. Other members of the delegation are Division Generals Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Ulises Rosales del Toro, both Politburo members; Carlos Aldana Escalante, Central Committee Secretary; Isidoro Malmierca, Foreign Minister; Ricardo Alarcon, Vice Foreign Minister; and Division Generals Leopoldo Cintra Frias, Pascual Martinez Gil, Ramon Espinoza Martin, Jesus Bermudez Cutino, Ruben Martinez Puente, (Victor Chuit Cobas), and Rafael Moracen Limonta. Also in the delegation are Rodolfo Puentes Ferro and Jesus Arbesu Fraga, deputy chief of a PCC Central Committee department; and Comrade Martin Mora, ambassador to the People's Republic of Angola.

The tripartite agreement will be signed at United Nations headquarters by the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa. The agreement details the essential aspects that will guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. This will fulfill UN Resolution 435 that was passed in 1978 on the independence of Namibia and peacekeeping in southwest Africa.

Also at this meeting, an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Cuban Government will be signed. This agreement will deal with the termination of the Cuban military contingent's internationalist mission.

Agreement Signing 22 Dec

FL2112132588 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 21 Dec 88

[Text] The tripartite agreement which permits Namibia's independence and which guarantees respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola will be signed tomorrow [22 Dec] at the United Nations. The UN Secretariat announced that the treaty will be signed by Foreign Ministers Afonso Van Dunem for Africa, Isidoro Malmierca for Cuba, and Roelof Pik Botha for South Africa. United Nations sources reported that Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN secretary general, will attend as a witness and will speak at the ceremony following the signing of the treaty. Also present at the ceremony will be U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet deputy minister for African affairs, Anatoliy Adamishin. The ceremony will also be attended by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which is composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the PRC.

In addition to the tripartite agreement, Cuba and Angola will sign a bilateral agreement aimed withdrawing the Cuban internationalist mission in Angola. The Security Council approved yesterday a resolution which allows the United Nations to verify, with approximately 70 military observers and 20 civilians, the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Once the signing ceremony is over, George Shultz has invited the participants for a toast at the headquarters of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

The Cuban delegation to the signing of the agreements is already in New York and it is headed by Jorge Risquet, member of the PCC Central Committee Politburo. The delegation is also composed of Carlos Aldana, secretary of the PCC Central Committee, the foreign minister and vice minister, several high-ranking generals, and other officials.

Castro on Mexico, USSR, U.S., Other Issues

FL0912043088 Havana Television Cubana Network in Spanish 0130 GMT 7 Dec 88

[News conference held by President Fidel Castro with international reporters in Mexico City on 3 December—recorded; passages within slantlines represent indistinct portions of this news conference that were supplied from an identical recorded version carried on Havana Cubavision Television in Spanish at 0331 GMT 9 December]

[Text] [Unidentified moderator] Good afternoon distinguished colleagues. With us is President Fidel Castro, who will answer your questions. As usual, we ask our comrades to identify themselves when they ask their questions and to identify the organization they represent. We have /already assembled some of the interested reporters who wish/ to ask questions. Let's get started.

[Castro] How are we going to do this? Who have you assembled?

[Moderator] We have assembled some comrades who wish to ask questions. We will start with that list and then we will open the floor to questions. For the first question, Enriqueta Cabrera from EL DIA. There are microphones, so please ask for them when you have the floor.

[Cabrera] Commander Fidel Castro, after almost 30 years what is your assessment of this, your first visit to Mexico?

[Castro] A general assessment of 30 years? How's this?

[Moderator][Words indistinct]

[Castro] It's very difficult to give an assessment like that in a few brief words. I think time has flown by. I have many impressions. The first impression was of the city. I lived in one city and now I find myself in another. If you dropped me off somewhere around here I would need guides, maps, and I don't know how many other things in order to orient myself. Other impressions concern the great changes that have taken place in Mexico. Mexicans have built the largest city in the world, and the most heavily populated. This was done with the sweat and effort of the Mexicans, although it's too big.

In the past 30 years I have seen a change in a group who has progressed in many ways. There is a cultural and technological level that is considerable. These are my first impressions. I believe the trip has been useful. For me, personally, it has been very satisfactory. I have had many meetings. I believe those meetings have been useful.

If you ask me, from an emotional point of view, it is extraordinary, in a certain way, that I find myself here almost 32 years after having left. I think I left on 24 November. We took the boat on 25 November and arrived in Cuba on 2 March [corrects himself] 2 December. Yesterday was exactly 32 years since we arrived; today makes it 32 years and 1 day.

I don't know if back then, when we were heading for Cuba, we could imagine that all those things could happen, and to relive all the emotions of finding myself again in this city. That's what I can tell you. It's not a very broad assessment, but it's an attempt to answer your question.

[Moderator] The floor now goes to Berta Fernandez of EL UNIVERSAL.

[Castro] This is tremendous. How many rolls of film are you people using up? [laughter] Flashes, lights, human eyesight wasn't meant for that. When the robots begin to take care of government's affairs they will be able to tolerate this a little better. So many cameras and flashes. Where is she?

[Fernandez] Commander, I would like to ask you two things please. The first is that yesterday you spoke of the need to not destabilize Mexico, does this mean that the advancement of the left-wing should stop? Also, I would like you to tell us please a little about the aggressions by [words indistinct] that your country has received from the power of the north.

[Castro] Well look, the statements should be kept in context. I didn't say; I didn't issue that sentence regarding Mexico as a warning to anyone. I was talking about the political and historical processes of Latin America, and the difficult economic situation that Latin American countries are enduring, and about the consequences, of a political nature, that these events are having on this hemisphere. I was saying that we should try to prevent Mexico from being destabilizing. I meant to say that Mexico is a very special country.

It is a country of 85 million inhabitants. It is a complex country that has its own history which is known from the last century to the present century. It has achieved the highest level of stability in the whole hemisphere, much more than any other Latin American regime, government, or state. I was saying that it was a conquest, an achievement. Mexico is a country of such weight, importance, magnitude, of such international prestige, of such importance to Latin America that I expressed a wish; the wish that Mexico not be destabilized as a result of all the problems we are experiencing, problems that are truly objective. This really doesn't have anything to do with the activities that are undertaken by the political parties of this country.

On the contrary, I can say as a general guideline, that in spite of our being revolutionaries, in spite of our having had to used an armed struggle to free our country from tyranny, and despite having had a revolution in Cuba, I have always said that violence is to be used as a last resort. I have always thought, as did our most illustrious patriot Jose Marti, that you should pursue nonpolitical means when all other paths are closed. Marti lived in a special suppressed state because there was no freedom from the Spaniards. He knew then that there was no other alternative but war in the struggle to gain independence. He used to say that the war had to be short so that the sacrifices would be few. I think if Cuba's independence could have been gained without war, he would have done everything possible to gain it without war.

On other occasions I have said that Lenin himself, and extraordinary revolutionary of our century... [changes thought] I'm sure if he and his party had an opportunity to make the social changes in that country, in that old

empire of the czars, without war, he would have done so. This is a general thought. I am in favor of change and I always prefer that changes come about like that. I think that all conscious men, men who think, who know the costs of social changes would prefer them without violence.

I don't have to advise anyone because no one here is advocating violence. It was just a general thought because this hemisphere is a powder keg! It looks like it's going to explode. If the problems aren't solved it's going to blow up. It will happen just as it did in other cultures, in other times, due to problems of an objective nature that were created. Then, while I was thinking about the Latin America situation and while thinking about the repercussions that all these problems have on the stability of these countries, I expressed that idea. It was not a warning to anyone nor was it advice to anyone and I certainly don't think that there is the possibility of violence or destabilization in Mexico. When I said, I wished this, I meant that Mexico not be affected by all the problems affecting Latin America. I was expressing a wish.

About the war of words [preceding word in English], well, what war can we refer to? There is a war of words. The empire has a monopoly on all mass media. It is a form of war against not only Cuba, but everyone. The world knows, almost, what the empire wants. It's a type of war, and it is carried out against countries especially like Cuba and Nicaragua; against socialist countries, against revolutionary countries. The beauty of this is that they want to broadcast, but they don't want anyone to broadcast to them. They claim the right, as they call it, to inform other countries, but when we want to inform them they say: No, that's not right, that produces interference, etcetera, etcetera.

I don't know if you want to know something more specific, but its such a generic question on the war of words. I can tell you that there is a universal war of words; a reactionary war against all just thoughts and /of the people's interests. That war regarding Cuba/ has been going on for a long time. From the very triumph of the revolution a number of stations were created. The empire has the so-called Voice of America [VOA]. They've even taken the name of the hemisphere. The whole world knows them as Americans, as if we belonged to some other hemisphere, or some other planet.

The VOA is broadcast throughout the entire world. Pirate stations were established. They established a medium-wave station on Swan Island during the years of the Giron invasion and the psychological war against Cuba. They have done it throughout the 30 years of the revolution. Just recently a special program for Cuba was established. Cuba has always received broadcasts from the United States. What offended our people is that station was given the name of Jose Marti. That's an insult! It's an insult to our people, an insult to the memory of a man like Marti. It's as if they established a station north of here to inform, educate, and indoctrinate Mexicans and named it Hidalgo, Morelos, or Benito Juarez. I think if a Mexican sees this he would feel as offended as we Cubans do.

Further more, we know that there is a strong ideological war, an ideological struggle, /which is going to last a long time/. I think that as long as empires exist there will be psychological and ideological wars against all progressive ideas in this world. We are fairly immune to all of that so I think we can stand up to this pretty well. We've been there for 30 years. We're still there. All of us are still there. I believe that the words, and ideas that come out through—are such nonsense at times—do almost no harm. AIDS is more dangerous than the war of words.

[Moderator] It is now /EFE's/ (Francisco Osaba)'s turn.

[(Osaba)] Thank you very much. Commander, two questions if I may. First, your conversations with the president of Colombia, in these past few days, have caused anticipation. Why is that? Second, for several years we Spanish have been waiting for your visit. When will this take place?

[Castro] When will you invite me?

[(Osaba)] You are invited.

[Castro] You want me to go to Spain as a tourist? [laughter] I've already made a technical stopover there. When I receive an invitation I'll see. It depends on my work schedule. I'm happy that you are waiting for a visit and I thank you. However, to visit Spain I need an invitation. What? [Castro is heard whispering to someone but words are indistinct] What does a visit to Spain have to do with talking to Barco? [Colombian President Virgilio Barco]

[Unidentified speaker] [Words indistinct]

[Castro] Oh, to [words indistinct] when I'm going to Spain. I have Spanish blood, as we almost all do, and we have very good relations with Spain. It has always been an interesting country. [Words indistinct] in spite of having no other alternative than to fight the Spaniards because they were too stubborn and didn't want to solve the problems via negotiation.

I've had talks with President Barco. It's not the first time we've met. I got together with him in Ecuador and we met again here and had breakfast. The meeting was very friendly and cordial. Even though we don't have formal diplomatic relations, we have real relations based on respect. In that meeting we talked about bilateral subjects and other things, but we basically talked about general things, such as international affairs having to do with Latin America. We also spoke about international politics. I don't see why there has to be any anxiety about this. I thought the meeting was quite normal and we exchanged views on things that are of interest to Cuba,

Colombia, and Latin America. We talked about things of international interest, nothing special. For me it was very pleasant to have the opportunity to exchange views with President Barco. He has always been very nice every time I've had the chance to meet him.

[Moderator] Very well. The floor now goes to (Gerardo Arreola) from LA JORNADA.

[(Arreola)] Commander, I want to ask you two questions. It has been 2 years since the Third PCC Congress ended with the initiative to rectify errors and negative activities in your country. What has happened with this campaign? Has it worked and how far has it gone? Second, your presence here in Mexico now, and in Quito, some weeks ago, is highly significant with respect to Cuba's process of rapproachement with Latin America. What is your assessment of the present relations between Cuba and Latin America?

[Castro] The questions you people ask are enough to write a thesis. [laughter] I recall that the main report of the Third PCC Congress had 10 pages dedicated to analyzing the things that were wrong. This is in keeping with the traditional spirit of self-criticism that has been characteristic of our revolutionary process. Further on, we began to delve deeper into those problems. We analyzed mistakes and negative activities that have occurred in the past 10 years, between the First and Third PCC Congresses. We tackled those things that we were aware of and considered to be mistakes and negative occurrences.

That was, fundamentally, associated with the construction of socialism in our country. We had, and I'm trying to be concise, two phases. One phase was categorized as idealism, although /perhaps we tried to move too quickly and skip/ phases. Later, when improving those idealistic mistakes, we applied a system of guidance for the economy. This, to a large degree, compiled the experiences of other socialist countries in their construction of socialism. Then tendencies of another type began to crop up. I would say that they were errors in mercantilism. Sometimes I use a stronger word and say they are mistakes of profiteering [mercachiflismo].

Some enterprises began to play around with economic concepts and categories associated with capitalism. They used these as instruments in the construction of socialism. I remember, and perhaps some of you may know, how Che warned us, with great concern, about the risks of using capitalist notions in the construction of socialism. We had the opportunity to see some of the consequences and effects in practice. When some of our administrators, or /many of our/ administrators, began to act with capitalist mentalities. /They were called shoddy capitalists/. They didn't have the efficiency of the capitalists, on the one hand, and at the same time they played at being capitalists with notions of rent, profits, prizes, etcetera. This would take time to explain. It would become a conference to analyze history, doctrine, politics, and things of a great variety.

However, these phenomena began to occur. Volunteer work began to decrease. People wanted to solve almost everything with money and for money. We were beginning to fall into the capitalist trap. Another bad habit we developed, which is also very negative, was the belief that by inventing various mechanisms which copy capitalist things, socialism would build itself. Socialism constitutes the first opportunity in the history of man to program development. You shouldn't let yourself be dragged around by blind laws, similar to ones that the capitalist system drags around. /The capitalists themselves have tried to make/ corrections because they can't leave them alone.

Under these conditions of socialism we began to develop the mentality that mechanisms, which were virtually self-created, promoted the development and construction of socialism. I think that's one of the most negative tendencies. We can't abandon the belief that development must be programmed. /This is one of the/ great privileges of socialism. /Of true socialism/. There's so much socialism and so many people call themselves socialists. We're speaking seriously, right? [Words indistinct] constructing a society, a new society that is completely separated from capitalism. Those tendencies were causing serious damage.

I have only mentioned a few things to try to explain what the rectification process means. It has meant a lot because the laurels of the revolutionary spirit's solidarity and enthusiasm have become green again. Not like the man who only thinks about money. It's as if he were a little horse with a carrot dangling in front to make him go forward, or a whip hitting him from behind to make him go forward./Human society, mankind, must go forward, but not because it has a carrot dangling in front of it, or a whip/. I think those values are very important. /Ours is a small country/ next to the empire which is only 90 miles.... [changes thought] It's less than 90 miles because the base in Guantanamo is a very close. It's in our own country. It's an imperial base imposed on our country by force.

What has kept us going are values. Not the values of consumer societies, but moral and spiritual values, patriotism, the feeling of human solidarity which is so extraordinarily developed in our people. That's what has made us strong! That's what has permitted us to endure despite all the campaigns, the war of words, other types of wars, and the economic blockades. Our revolution is set over a very solid base; over very solid and profound values. We must preserve those values. Nobody created the revolution for us. We did it ourselves! No one defended it, and no one can defend, our revolution. We have defended it and we are defending it!

Of course the empire wants to destroy the revolution: them and their theoreticial and the Santa Fe Group talk. Sometimes they say it has to be destroyed by force. Other times they say it has to be weakened from within. If a revolution like ours, on a small island 90 miles away from the United States, is not built on solid values, it wouldn't be able to stand up to that powerful empire. Our people are willing to fight. They are willing to die defending their ideals. We are not a country that is going to compete with the consumer societies of the empire, societies it created by looting and exploiting the world. We don't exploit anyone. We live from our sweat and work. We don't live off the riches of other countries. We live with honor and dignity. We will not ridiculously compete with consumer goods against the imperialist societies. Any other country can make a mistake and nothing will happen to it. Perhaps it is the neighbor of a big socialist country and they can help them. The neighbor we have is the other one. We can't make mistakes or be careless.

We cannot underestimate the moral values. We can't underestimate the awareness of the person in any sense. That's why we had to rectify those tendencies that distanced us from these principles and took us toward a principle of consumerism or alienation. Everything was done simply because you got paid so much. This does not mean that we ignore the laws and principles of socialism, the system of socialist compensation which has to be in accordance with the quantity and quality of the work that each person gives to society. I can tell you that the assessment is frankly positive.

The other question pertains to my trips to Ecuador and Mexico. These trips are signs of the new times. They are signs of the greater spirit of independence of the Latin American peoples. They are signs of the greater need for relations and unity. They are signs of a greater awareness of who is plundering and exploiting us. They are a signs that the policy of blockading and isolating Cuba has failed.

We previously did not attend inauguration ceremonies simply because we weren't invited. This time we were invited. We were invited to Ecuador and we went with pleasure. This time Mexico invited us and based on our experience in Ecuador where we had so many contacts with so many delegations, with so many Latin American forces—we were able to hold talks, exchange views, opinions, and, in a certain sense, to unite wills and efforts—we came away defending the idea that we should unite even more and fight united, not separately, against the great problems of our times so that we can truly call ourselves independent nations.

We fought for all those ideas. That is why I highly value such opportunities to make these contacts. That is why I accepted the invitation to come to Mexico, a country with which we have special relations. I don't know if its a worn-out phrase, but to Cubans, Mexico is like a /second fatherland/. It has been so; that is what we think of Mexico. It's not just a phrase. It has been demonstrated by actions.

Throughout our history, Marti came to Mexico during the colonial era and many Cubans came here to fight. During the difficult times of our fatherland during the tyranny of Machado [former President Gerardo Machado], many Cubans came here to Mexico to organize and fight. After the Batista military coup, we came here when the struggle became impossible. We received hospitality and shelter here. We felt that Mexico was ours and that we had the right to work for Cuba here in Mexico. This has not just been done by Cubans; all of Latin America has done this. When the Uruguayans had serious problems they came here to Mexico. When the people of Argentina had very serious problems, they came here to Mexico. When the Pinochet coup occurred and the fierce repression began; when people disappeared and crimes took place in Chile, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans [corrects himself] Chileans came here to Mexico. This was also done by the Nicaraguan patriots and many other countries. We had Latin Americans here from everywhere, from all countries where there were tyrannies or repressive governments.

Many people left their countries and came here because they saw Mexico as common ground. The most secure place they encountered during all these years was our common home: Mexico. They continued fighting and working for their countries here. That's why for the Latin Americans, especially for Cubans, Mexico is our common home.

Mexico is the only Latin American country that did not sever relations, the only Latin American country that did not follow the orders of the United States. It maintained relations. It is a country with which, through all these years and with different governments, we have carried out common struggles in the international arena.

Those are special reasons. We have with Mexico [words indistinct]. The invitation is a positive action, a constructive action and that's why I did not hesitate to travel to Mexico even though our relations with Mexico are not the result of circumstances; they are historic. They do not pertain to relations with men. They are relations with institutions, a country, a state which interests us very much. It is a state that we Latin Americans need very much. Latin Americans need Mexico's presence and actions at this crucial time. That is why I can say: Yes, these trips are signs of the new times and of improved relations between Cuba and Latin America. The relations are changing.

The United States does not like this at all because it demonstrates the total failure of the policy of isolating Cuba from Latin America. It is Cuba's vindication for Latin America; the Latin America that one day left us alone at the mercy of the empire. The Latin America that

at one time associated itself with the empire to try and destroy our revolution. The only exception to this was Mexico. There was later another large and durable exception: the peoples of Latin America. They never joined the treason, the isolation, the blockade, the attempt to destroy the revolution.

Thirty years have passed. We've been patient. We've persevered. We've been firm, loyal, and true to our principles. We have not changed. Latin America's conditions have changed and that is what can be seen in these new acts and in our presence at this ceremony marking the change in government.

I don't know if I answered your question. You'll excuse me if my answer is relatively long.

[Moderator] (Eduardo Kras Lune) of the REUTER PRESS AGENCY now has the floor.

[(Kras Lune)] Commander, there has been much speculation on the eventual changes that will take place in U.S. policy with the George Bush administration. We would be interested in knowing what expectations Cuba has in respect to this new presidential administration. That's one question. My second question is: After your remarks 3 years ago on the foreign debt, do you think that the situation has changed at all, above all, taking into consideration the presidential change in the United States?

[Castro] In reference to Bush, they say he is less of an ideologue than Reagan and he is a more pragmatic man. That's what is said by Democrats, Republicans, and other international politicians and analysts. A pragmatic man is always preferable to a man who is a recalcitrant reactionary with the mentality of the past century—without offending the last century [laughter]—as Reagan is.

These are nothing more than theories. We will see how international and domestic policies develop, how they play this and replay it in the United States itself. We do not want to build up any hopes right now. We simply want to see what is done, what occurs. We want to see how the new Bush administration acts.

In regard to the debt, the situation now is much worse. We led a large battle against the problem of the debt throughout 1987. Above all, it was a battle to develop awareness and unite wills. We met with representatives from Latin America. We me with people from all sectors: students, journalists, women, peasants, trade unions, political personalities.

In the year 1985, we saw the most important psychological opportunity to carry out the battle not just against the debt, but against the causes of the debt, which are protectionism, unequal trade, and all those forms of plundering, which victimize our peoples. In 1985, the creditor powers, our plunderers, were not prepared. In my opinion, this was the best time to conduct a united battle. That was the best time for all Latin American countries, all Third World countries to unite.

Three years have passed and if we analyze everything that was said in 1985, one can see how strictly and precisely the predictions have been fulfilled since then. Creditor countries have been able to manipulate the situation. They've held talks, one-by-one, with each of the creditors [as heard]. It's like the cat talking to each of the rats individually. It's like Gulliver holding talks with each of the Lilliputians.

The /very strength/ of each of these countries with so many problems, so many difficulties /is that they never had/ to face the united attitude of these countries. Debtor countries were not even able to do what trade union workers do. They can't meet to overcome something, to get better salaries. We were not able to do this. Now all the consequences can be seen. Not everyone was aware the problem. We can even say that many people were not aware of this situation. Now, after 2 [as heard] years, there is more awareness of the serious nature of the problem, of the consequences of this problem.

It is also clear that what was said about the debt being unpayable and uncollectable is a reality. Everyone now knows that the debt is unpayable and uncollectable. No one even speaks about the debt anymore. Even in financial circles, the Latin American foreign debt is now worth half or less than half of what it used to be worth. It's worth about 50, 45, or 40 percent but it's lower than 50 percent /of its value, but they are still charging/ interest and interest rates are tremendous.

What happens is that they charge less each time because there's less money each time. There's constantly less money for capital flight. Each time there's less money that can be taken out of our countries' economies although money is still being extracted from our economies.

It's similar to someone who is in an accident. He's taken to the hospital and instead of giving him blood; they take blood from him or the patient dies and they continue to take the little bit of blood he has left. That's the picture today of the economies of Latin America and the Third World. We're closer here to Latin America. Does the economy grow or not? The economies of Latin American countries are at a standstill. The gross domestic product [producto real] per capita is less each time and income is less than what was earned in 1978. There are no solutions in sight. There is less purchasing power for products. It's a truly tragic situation.

I think you asked, or you alluded to, what can be expected from the U.S. Administration. You said something. /I think the one from REUTER said something/.

[(Kras Lune)] I was referring to the debt.

[Castro] It was on the debt? They/themselves have/many problems. Do you think they will be aware of this?

I think that U.S. Administrations have been characterized by nearsightedness. They have lacked long-distance vision [luz larga]. They have not been able to foresee the problems and the events that may arise.

I /have told this to/ many U.S. politicians. The Government of the United States does not make policies. Instead, they improvise policies. They have always been guided by improvised policies. It is possible that during Roosevelt's time and during the great crisis of the 1930's, a U.S. Government or statesman may have been able to make domestic and international policy. The last president who improvised a policy, but at least, at least [repeats himself] he drew it up, was Kennedy. This occurred after the triumph of the Cuban revolution. The triumph of the Cuban revolution scared the empire very much. The empire was so afraid that the same would be repeated throughout the length and width of Latin America that they drew up a strategy, or they improvised a strategy known as the Alliance for Progress.

I see many young faces here, yes, young faces; don't smile [laughter], they may not be as informed about the things that occurred at that time. Anyway, after the revolution, the panic and the scare of the empire was such that they elaborated a policy called Alliance for Progress. Then, they began talking about reforms. The United States even began talking about agrarian reforms—a term which had only been used by progressive parties. Before the Kennedy era, whoever would speak of agrarian reform would be accused of being a communist. The Government of Guatemala was overthrown because it carried out an agrarian reform. Anyway, they began talking about agrarian and fiscal reforms, social, education, health, and housing improvements, as well as improvements in the redistribution of wealth. They even offered aid totalling $20,000 billion. That was 27 years ago, almost 28.

That was at the beginning of 1961, when they preparing the invasion of Giron against Cuba. Ever since they they have been... [shifts thought] At that time, Latin America did not have a foreign debt. At that time, our products were worth something and could purchase something, much more than today. The population, back then was less than half of what it is today. We had 20 percent of the problems we have today—all types of problems. Today, the debt is 410,000 billion. Our products aren't worth anything. Plundering is greater each time. The situation is much more critical; and these nearsighted people haven't even realized there is a problem. Maybe, they'll discover it one of these days. Hopefully, they will discover it. It would be better if they did, because no one knows the consequences of all these problems. Maybe, they'll even elaborate a policy. The logical thing to do would be for them to be somewhat concerned—and not just come up with some band-aid solutions. They should be ready to hold discussions, dialogues with Latin America to erase the debt and establish the new international economic order which was approved by the United Nations, a few years ago.

They should be ready to find basic solutions to the problems of Latin America. /They should not seek band-aid solutions,/ because all this allows for destabilization, social uprisings, revolutions. Then they want to solve it by sending Marines, waging dirty wars, invading countries. Of course, up until now, they have been been able to carry out that policy because it has been a matter of [rewords] because these changes have taken place in small countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, or Grenada. In Grenada, they solved the problem—there, where the revolution had committed suicide—by landing their Marines and sending battalions of the airborne division. If some day, as a result of these problems, social uprisings /occur/ in South America, for example, I wonder if they can solve the problem by dropping paratroopers from the 82d airborne division. I think that if there is upheaval in that world, they will not be able to solve the problem in that manner. That world could devour not only one but 100 airborne divisions.

We cannot be /advocates/ of catastrophes; we prefer to foresee and resolve problems. We would even prefer for changes to take place without violence in this hemisphere. That is why I say that hopefully, they'll become aware—not just them. It's not only them who have to become aware, but also the European Economic Community, the rest of the developed capitalist /countries/ to solve these problems not only in Latin America but also for the whole Third World. But this is the situation, these are the differences. Let's see if the understanding of the current U.S. Administration is enlightened. Let's see if it understands and discovers the reality, and if it is capable of being ready to elaborate a policy. It would have to be a policy which is the result of negotiations with Latin America.

In Uruguay, I understand that the Group of Eight discussed this. They talked about establishing a dialogue with the new administration. I think that they should not speak on behalf of the Group of Eight. I think that they should seek the support and the representation of all Latin American countries so that they can speak and discuss matters on everyone's behalf. I think they should express themselves as representatives of a whole continent, this continent, which is suffering while finding solutions. I think it is the duty of the current Latin American ruling classes—it is a duty. In Ecuador, someone asked a question about this matter.

I said that, maybe, if there would have been some wise kings, there would not have been a French revolution. Maybe, if there would have been some wise czars, there would not have been a Russian revolution. /This is/ a similar situation, because I can see [rewords] and I will say it directly that objective conditions are being created in Latin America /which will give birth to great/ social

uprisings. The most we can hope for is that the ruling classes, the current ruling classes are wise enough to find solutions to this problem which will allow peaceful changes, and not traumatic events, to occur in Latin American societies.

[Moderator] It is now Marta Solis' turn from EL NACIONAL.

[Solis] I am a journalist for EL NACIONAL. Commander, what do you think of democracy, and what do you think of Mexico's democratic process in the past few years?

[Castro] You are asking me about Mexico, and Mexico's democratic process? I think I shouldn't give opinions on Mexico's internal matters. I wouldn't want to make assessments of that nature, much less at this time when there are disagreements in Mexico, as you know. Therefore, I would not like to make assessments about the host country which has invited me.

[Solis] What about your concept of democracy?

[Castro] In which world?

[Solis] In the world that you live in, Commander.

[Castro] I think there are many concepts about democracy. There are some concepts, /but I think,/ someone, I think it was someone form the United States who defined democracy in pharases which became famous. I think it was Lincoln who said that democracy is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. That has always been my concept of democracy, and it is the concept that we have applied in our country. Anything else? You are always asking complicated, complex questions.

[Solis] No, it is not complex. Are you in a democratic country or not?

[Castro] Yes, I am in a democratic country. However, democracy does not allow me to comment on the internal matters of the host country. [laughter] I do not want to make assessments of that type. I have my own opinions, but I should not make them. I made the decision not to interfere, in the least, in the internal matters of Mexico. So here I am speaking, you can derive conclusions from the facts. Draw your own conclusions. [laughter] Haven't I been invited here, to be in front of all these illustrious journalists, and to answer all these questions? But I don't have the freedom to express myself about all that. At least, personally, I am enjoying a great democracy here in Mexico. [laughter]

[Moderator] Well, now the floor goes to Jose Luis Alcazar from IPS agency. He has gone out?

[Castro] He has left? [Words indistinct] the question? What newspaper is he from?

[Moderator] He is from IPS agency.

[Castro] What agency is the IPS? [laughter]

[Moderator] It is the INTERNATIONAL PRESS SERVICE.

[Castro] And what countries does it more or less represent?

[Moderator] Its headquarters is in Rome.

[Castro] It is Roman. Didn't he have the question there?

[Moderator] No.

[Castro] Oh, well!

[Moderator] It is now Jaqueline Gallardo's turn. /From the ABC network/.

[Castro] Jaqueline from ABC. Where is Jaqueline?

[Gallardo] Here I am, Commander.

[Castro] Very well. Jaqueline what?

[Moderator, Gallardo simultaneously Reply] Gallardo.

[Gallardo] Just a few days from Mr Gorbachev's visit to your country, do you feel really pressured by this perestroyka process? And, what is the significance of Gorbachev's visit to your country, exactly at this moment?

[Castro] We have never [repeats himself] been pressured by perestroyka, because if perestroyka creates pressure, then it's not perestroyka. [laughter] It would be something else. So, by definition, we cannot feel pressured.

The visit means a lot to us, because Gorbachev is a friend. It is a country which we truly love, it has expressed solidarity with us in very difficult times. It has cooperated with our country. It has given us proof of friendship. The visit means welcoming a friend. It is not the first time that I will have spoken to Gorbachev. I have already had the privilege of doing it more than once. I have excellent and pleasant memories of my meetings with him—his fresh approach to matters, his intelligence, his ability to converse. We have spoke about many subjects. His visit to Cuba, and his being here for a bit, is a great opportunity for dialogue and an exchange of ideas on any subject he wants. /We can talk about /international politics, peace and current prospects in which he has put great effort. Therefore, we look forward to the visit.

There are always people who are plotting, doing things, and talking about differences, things, and problems between the Soviets and us. I have told him that people comment on the fact that we do not do things exactly the same way. He tells me: Why should we do things exactly

the same way? So, we do things differently; we are two different countries, with different mentalities, different idiosyncracies, and different process, and because there are no two nations alike. Do you know of two which are alike? The situation is similar to wanting to do things as the Mexicans do them or as the Nicaraguans do them. That does not make any sense. I don't think there have been two similar revolutions in the world. That is one of the major /lessons/. The problems the Soviets have had are the different from the ones we have had. The way they carried out their agrarian reform and solved their problems is different from the way we did it.

But I want to tell you—and of course it cannot be /otherwise/—all this makes me laugh because they say we are satellites of the Soviets. They say we do what the Soviets do. Therefore, if we do not do exactly what the Soviets do, then we are bad according to others. There was some Yankee gentleman who spoke at a Caribbean basin meeting. He said that we were the Albania of the West, or of the Caribbean, something like that—a very strange, bizzare thing. [laughter] Notice the new terminology. I don't know what illusions they have about perestroyka. I wonder if they think that they can carry out that kind of campaign, or if they think they can sow discord, or division between the Soviets and us. Those are Yankee illusions, because we are never going to give up our sacred right of independence and absolute freedom, nor will the bonds of solidarity, or fraternal and revolutionary relations which exist between the Soviet Union and us be broken. I know that in the United States there is great interest in all these things. /They think, well/ if Cuba ends up alone, isolated, if the relations between Cuban and Soviets /are affected, /we'll swallow up Cuba. I say, how can they swallow us by themselves? It would be easier to swallow a steel hedgehog. It would be easier to swallow a hedgehog the size of the moon, than to swallow Cuba—I assure you of that. But there are some illusions about that. That is why I take advantage of the question, to clarify some things, okay? Doesn't that seem right to you? Thank you very much. [laughter, applause]

[Moderator] It is now Olga Bejar's turn from Bogota EL ESPECTADOR.

[Bejar] Correction, I am from /SERVIPRENSA/ press agency and Caracol radio station. Commander Castro. I am here, to your right.

[Castro] What I was missing! [laughter]

[Bejar] Here I am. What is your opinion about the way in which the fight against drug trafficking is being handled in Latin America, and the United State, as well as from the United States? [Words indistinct] you, the officials and persons who say they are certain there is a Colombia-Cuba-Nicaragua connection for drug dealing?

[Castro] For drug dealing? I think that the fight against drugs has not yet been dealt with properly. We have been /saying that/ ever since 1985. The drug problem is not a Latin American invention. The drug problem is an invention of the imperialist consumption societies. I remember that a few years ago this problem did not exist. I remember when we were in Mexico, there was contraband, maybe of automobiles, and of other things, but there was no problem... [rewords] or the states did not have to face the drug problems. Fortunately, it is a problem that Cuba has not been familiar with, fortunately.

However, this problem evolves from the habits, negative tendencies of the consumption societies—they created the market. When they created a market—in a hemisphere full of problems and needs—many peasants in some Latin American countries instead of growing corn began /growing coca trees, and marijuana /because it was... [rewords] well, they couldn't make a living with what they had, so they began growing that. That is why I think drug trafficking—one of the most serious problems of our hemisphere, countries, and societies—is a problem /that began/ in the United States. We must thank the United States for another inheritance they have left us. They are dealing with it only in repressive terms—in terms of fumigation, arms, planes for fumigation and not in economic terms. The economic issue must also be dealt with. When there are tens of millions of people going hungry, and there are tens of millions of unemployed, how can you propose the solution to drug trafficking to be based only on repressive measures?

I think that this must be related to the economic problems which Latin America is facing. I think it must be one of the subjects for discussion between Latin American representatives and the new administration. I think that the problems of the debt, unequal trade, protectionism, and the new order, as well as the /drug/ problem must be discussed—as one of the most serious problems. Drugs are even beginning to threaten the stability of the states. They are threatening it with colossal anarchy. They are already affecting the very integrity of states, or of some Latin American states. That is why one of the problems in my talks with Latin American leaders... [rewords] We have discussed this as one of the most serious problems to which we must find a solution. However, we must find a Latin American solution. We must find a solution based on a Latin American policy, and not something which is imposed by the empire—which was the one to cause this phenomenon. We should be able to say that we are ready to fight in order to resolve this problem, and that we are ready to cooperate with those who created the drug problem. You must be ready to cooperate to find a solution for the Latin American problems. I think those are the proper terms in which that problem must be dealt with.

As for the accusations you were talking about, they are nothing but proof of cynicism and the nerve of imperialism. Those are the kinds of accusations imperialists

make against Nicaragua and Cuba. I am telling you that Cuba is the most drug free country in the world [repeats himself]. It is a country—there are few countries in the world that can say this—where no drug money has ever entered. This is so, despite the fact that we are a blocked country—a country which the empire has tried to asphyxiate.

This is so even though there has been no morale to protest it but we've done it for revolutionary ethics.

There is a long history on the number of traffickers that have passed through here and have been caught. Who are the people who come here? They are the ones who get lost in their boats. They get lost and arrive on our coast. Their motor breaks down. They enter our jurisdictional waters. They had to land so they landed here. We have hundreds and hundreds of people who have been tried. We don't know how many U.S. citizens we've tried until family members or political representatives asked us to please reduce their sentences /all that/. /To accuse Nicaragua and Cuba is prooof of their nerve/.

What is proven is that the counterrevolution was trafficking in guns. Those who took weapons to Nicaragua were trafficking in drugs.

If we were dealing drugs, then we wouldn't have a debt. We wouldn't have a problem with convertible currency. Fortunately, we have never allowed ourselves to be swayed by those temptations. [Words indistinct] If you go there, you'll know we don't have problems. Marijuana is grown in Cuba. You can even grow it in the living room. Being so easy to grow marijuana in Cuba, the cases... [changes thought] The consumption of marijuana is sanctioned; not the sale of it. Our penal code sanctions the consumption of marijuana. /The cases of trials for drugs, such as cocaine and other kinds of drugs are practically never seen/.

We have a very healthy society, very healthy people and we can feel proud. I think we can say that it is the cleanest country in the world regarding drugs. It is also a country where not a single cent of drug money has ever entered. We know that many countries /deal with drug money even though the government does not want to. We know that governments do not organize that business/, but we even know the statistics on how much money, how much income is received in many countries from drugs.

Not a single cent of drug money has ever entered in Cuba. We have the cleanest pages, the cleanest history. It's not something that we have to defend. I simply tell you this because you asked me a question and I want to respond. We don't want /to feel irritated or furious because you are talking about an accusation they made against us. Our conscience is clear and we are so satisfied with it that we'll test it to see if those shameless people have a conscience/.

[Moderator] It is now Jorge Melendez' turn from EXCELSIOR newspaper.

[Castro] Where is EXCELSIOR?

[Moderator] Look, there he is in the back.

[Castro] /Have you ever been under lights like the ones/ over there? [laughter]

[Melendez] Commander, I have two questions.

[Castro, interrupting] electronics, television. Go ahead.

[Melendez] How are the quadripartite negotiations going between Cuba, Angola, South Africa and the United States regarding the problems? The United States has said that Cuba has intervened and is in a very difficult situation. Secondly, less than 30 years ago, Che Guevara said that there had to be one, two, and three Vietnams in Latin America. How do you view Latin America's situation regarding development and evolution?

[Castro] Well, what did you say about the negotiations, that Cuba intervened, that the situation is very difficult?

[Melendez] News agencies....

[Castro, interrupting] What have the news agencies been saying? When? Today?

[Melendez] No, not today, a long time ago. However, some news agencies still repeat it.

[Castro] What is it that they repeat?

[Melendez] They say that Cuba is intervenening in Angola. And /for that reason/ we asked how the four-way talks on this are going.

[Castro] So, what is your question? Are you asking whether or not we are interventionists, or how are the negotiations going?

[Melendez] The two are questions, Commander. [Words indistinct] type of intervention....

[Castro, interrupting] I think it is truly ridiculous to talk about Cuban interventionism in Angola. What we have done is to comply with the mandate of the international community, of the United Nations, of the people. If we are interventionists, why is it that the great majority of United Nations' countries support our presence in Angola? If we are interventionists, why does the Nonaligned Movement, almost unanimously, support the presence of our internationalist combatants in Angola? Where there is interventionism, the people revolt, they condemn the interventionists, and the Nonaligned become upset. /Because there is a great difference

between playing a revolutionary, internationalist, and solidarity role while being an interventionist/. The first to accept it or condemn it is the international opinion.

Of course, that is propaganda, or better yet a slogan of the empire. Everyone knows that one of the problems in the seventies was the struggle of the countries colonized by Portugal—the struggle of the people of Portuguese colonies for their independence. The Nonaligned, the organization of African countries, and the United Nations asked for support for those countries in the same way that today they ask for support for Namibian independence. They ask for support for the oppressed people of South Africa in their struggle against apartheid. We are the only country, located outside of Africa, that has sent its sons to fight against South African racism, fascim, and apartheid. This is of great historical merit. In the long run, the world opinion of today and of future generations will recognize it with great admiration. We are very proud of the solidarity role we played.

We have helped almost from the beginning of the triumph of the Cuban revolution. Since the sixties we have been helping the people of the Portuguese colonies, Guinea-Bissau, /Angola/, and Mozambique to a lesser degree because it was further away. Our people were there. During all those years.

When finally in 1975, they triumphed, we had the intervention from South Africa—the racist and fascist South Africa, the South Africa of apartheid. Angola asked us for help, and we sent them help. We had enough courage, and /audacity/ if they wanted help we would help them and we struggled, despite the fact that it is 10,000 km away. We struggled against the South Africans, and we helped to defeat the South Africans. We forced them to leave Angola, and we have remained there ever since.

Then they began again, once they recovered from the scare. They began once again to conspire, wage dirty wars, organize bands, and arm bands—something similar to Nicaragua. South Africa did with Angola what the United States does with Nicaragua—the dirty war. Not only that, but once in a while they intervened.

That is a story which has lasted /almost 14 years,/ until finally a crisis was created at the end of 1987 with a large scale South African intervention. It was not in the area where the Cuban troops were but toward the east of the Cuban troops. It was over 250 km, almost 300 km, from the last position of the Cuban troops in a place called Menongue. I would need a map here to explain this to you. It was to the east. We were defending a line of approximately 900 km from Namibia to Menongue. The South African intervention occurred against a group of Angolan troops in the southeast of Angola—300 km from our line. It was not the first time they did this, it was their second time. They did it to interfere in the actions of the Angolan Army against the counterrevolutionary bands. They intervened with their elite troops, tanks, and aviation. However, they didn't only intervene there, at 300 km, but they advanced. They advanced all the way to a place called Cuito Cuanavale which is 200 km to the east of our last position. There, in a shameless way, they tried to solve the war through military means. They tried to annihilate a group of Angolan troops, large brigades. They were some of the best Angolan troops. This created a tremendous crisis by the middle November 1987.

I was on my way back from the USSR. I had gone there for the 70th anniversary celebration. I had conversed there with my Soviet friends, with Comrade Gorbachev, not about this, however. By 7 November, the crisis had not quite taken shape yet. When we returned to Cuba, approximately 8 days later, a very serious crisis had been created. They were already trying to take Cuito Cuanavale and to annhilate to group of Angolan troops in Namibia. We found ourselves in a very difficult situation. Everyone was asking us to support them. The Angolans were asking us to support them. However, that was 200 km from our lines, from our last position. The logistical problems were very serious. We would have to travel through 200 km of forest roads. Frankly, that was not the ideal place for a decisive battle. But they asked us for help, and we had to support them. In order to support them, we needed to reinforce the troops, so we did it. I can say that our pilots and planes were very efficient in Angola. Many of them helped to save the situation. It was necessary to cross the 200 km, and /to send/ armored units to Cuito Cuanavale. There, along with the Angolans, we prepared the defense. We prepared a defense and the racist troops crashed right into the defense of Cuito Cuanavale.

The South Africans suffered in Cuito Cuanavale a sort of /little Stalingrad/. Their best troops crashed there against the Angolan-Cuban defense, against mine fields, artillery, and air force. In reality, our pilots took over and controlled the air [space]. What we did was to halt them. We created a trap there and they crashed. Since that was not the place for the decisive battle, a powerful troop was created with the reinforcements sent that advanced /toward toward the south/ and threatened the strategic points that were of more interest to South Africa. There were some clashes. The South Africans came out very badly. They faced a truly powerful force and decided to talk.

We had said that we did not want a military victory, that we were reinforcing the troops not to seek a decisive military victory but to find a solution to the problem. Talks had been going on for a long time between Americans and Angolans to find a political solution. South Africans made demands.

Only when South Africa faced a truly powerful force and saw the danger ahead did it decide to talk. We have agreed to talk because our goal—as I said before—was not to seek military victories but a political solution. That is what happened there [in Angola]. We have been

holding talks since then. Those talks have been long and hard because South Africans are not serious people. No one in the world believes in them. Neither Africa nor the United Nations believe in South Africa. South Africans are too sly. They are not serious in the talks. South Africa is not easy to deal with. The United States is more aware of that than anyone. I must say that I think the United States has been really making a serious effort as a mediator, although it a quote mediator unquote and a quote intermediary unquote. The United States is a very particular kind of mediator, because on the one hand it tries to solve the overall problem and on the other hand it helps UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. UNITA is the Angolan counterrevolutionary group—the Angolan contras.

The United States refuses to give up its presumed right to help the counterrevolutionaries in Angola. It refuses to give up that right. The United States, however, has been trying to seek an agreement that includes the implementation of UN Resolution No. 435, Namibia's independence, and the end of South African interference in Angola's internal affairs. We have reiterated our willingness to withdraw our contingent of internationalist soldiers from Angola if that agreement is reached.

We have been holding discussions on this basis. We have made a great deal of progress. We have really made a lot of progress along this complex, risky, and difficult road to try to agree on each detail and point. I do not want to prolong this explanation with technical details concerning this problem. We have already reached Resolution No 435. We have also agreed on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. We have agreed on establishing a time frame for that withdrawal and for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from the Namibian border. We agreed on the withdrawal of the Cuban troops toward the north and the beginning of the withdrawal of the Cuban troops to Cuba. We agreed on a withdrawal timetable.

Right now there are talks in Brazzaville. They are discussing specific details, but there are things we cannot accept. Cuba suggested a verification process—Cuba and Angola [corrects himself] suggested that the United Nations come to verify the withdrawal of our troops, and we are discussing this with the United Nations. We are discussing verification procedures. In essence, we already have an agreement with the United Nations concerning the verification of the withdrawal of our personnel. Now, however, South Africa wants to participate in that verification, and we do not agree to that.

Under no circumstances will we agree to that. We cannot let them be part of the verification process, because the verification process is a serious agreement that will be formalized by virtue of documents that Cuba and Angola will sign with the United Nations. The United Nations is the one that must verify the trop withdrawal. South African cannot have anything to do with that. There is a little word there. South Africa wants a certain phrase to appear on the quadripartite agreement, a phrase that grants it certain rights over the verification process. We do not agree with that. There are only very small details still pending. And the problem is not with Cuba. Cuba and Angola have worked hard, which the United States knows. The U.S. representatives who attended the negotiations know how much each party has worked, and they know the seriousness with which Cuba and Angola have worked. [Castro pounds the table] They know Cuba and Angola were guided by basic principles and did not yield in matters of principle or lose patience.

We are strong. We have 50,000 men there [in Angola]. That is no secret, it is common knowledge. We have a considerable number of weapons, tanks antiaircraft weapons, and expert pilots. The South Africans know what we have there, it is no secret.

We are not impatient. We would like to have peace, we would like to clear up the remaining details in order to withdraw our troops, but if we have to stay there 10 more years [Castro pounds the table] we have enough courage and strength in our people, enough solidarity and internationalist spirit to be there for 10 more years. We would stay 10 more years before yielding on matters of principle. That is the situation and what we are discussing there. Angolans and Cubans have discussed that and we strongly agree. That is what I can tell you.

The other question was about the three Vietnams. Basically, what is it that you want me to answer? Do you want me to say whether or not the slogan of the two or three Vietnams is correct, and whether or not it is valid? So actually, what is your question? I would like to know so that I don't waste too much time on this answer. I am asking you, the reporter.

[Melendez] What would Cuba's /attitude be today in Latin America now that certain democracies, which were closed before are now open?/

[Castro] Well, I am not going to challenge Che's slogan. At the time Che said it, it was absolutely correct. It must not be interpreted literally. I think it was in a letter that he wrote, or he said it at a conference. /He felt very deeply about the situation in Vietnam/. He said it in terms ... [rephrases] What he wanted to say is that if imperialists had to be committed not only in Vietnam ... [rephrases] or if revolutionary movements were developing in other areas, this would be like a form of solidarity with Vietnam. /In sum/ what Che wanted to say is something that can be expressed in a Spanish saying: Things have a way of turning out just the way you don't want them to. [Al que no quiere caldo, tres tazas; literally translated: He who doesn't want soup, give him three cups] So Che would say, if one cup of soup is not enough for imperialism, it must be given three cups—in a strategic sense. So, for the moment, he had the idea of carrying out a revolutionary process in South America—that is what he wanted to say. I do not have any contradictions to what Che said at that time.

Presently, there is no Vietnam. Although there are other phenomenona such as what is happening in Nicaragua, or the genocidal war that the United States supports in other parts of this hemisphere, specifically, in El Salvador.

But/that is not that old situation/. I believe that the situation in Latin America has /changed/ quite a bit. Democratic processes have opened up. At this time—as we said before—a dramatic situation exists in the economic area. I talked about this a lot in 1985. I was asked what was a priority, whether social changes or the survival of our countries, our countries' independence, and the possibility for development of our countries.

If conditions for independence do not exist, conditions for a revolution are much more difficult. When a revolution takes place such as in Nicaragua, the immediate result is Yankee hostility, economic blocking, dirty war, /and the attempts of economic suffocation/. In reality, we say it is more important to guarantee the conditions for independence. It is more important that Latin American countries unite in this battle against the foreign debt and to achieve the new international economic order so that the minimum and essential conditions for independence and development—and we add—for Latin American integration—are created. I believe these are basic principles and ideas. If you ask me what is more important in this struggle, whether the struggle and this unity or change in one or two countries, I would say this struggle is more important. I would not stop being a revolutionary because of this. I am not going to protest or die of sadness because one or two revolutions take place. I know what happens when they do take place and what happens afterwards, when countries are suffocating economically and they do not have possibilities of carrying out their revolutionary goals.

This is why I have said I believe in this battle for independence, for the survival of our peoples, to have the right of having a place in the world in the 21st century, which is at our doorstep. I believe this is more important today than a revolution in one country or another. This is the view I have. Conditions have changed. The Cuban revolution has not changed in the least, but conditions have changed in these 30 years in this hemisphere. They are totally different conditions and we create political strategies and our relations with Latin America in light of these concepts. Latin American leaders know this. I believe they understand perfectly that this is an accurate and constructive point of view. We have a number of things in common besides differences in systems. We are all being looted, we are all being choked, we are all being squashed.

I even said—this is the point of view I expressed to students, peasants, workers, everyone—we said Latin American countries could develop with what is being paid for the foreign debt. This is true in general. There are some countries which are so poor that they have nothing to pay and nothing to save. But in general, we said countries could develop with the $30 billion dollars that is paid for the debt every year. This is without counting capital flight and other forms of looting. I was saying that if the debt is wiped out it is incorrect to think that the money saved is going to be spent on; that money will be used for development. We told this to laborers. I know that there are many needs, but creditors claim that if this is done, countries cannot develop. We maintain that countries could develop if investments were made with the money being paid for the foreign debt. It would not have been right to present a popular slogan, any slogan or hope of investing those resources for consumption. We say the money has to be invested. I say this is vital, and fundamental. We were not creating demagogic platforms.

We were addressing the ones who suffer the most. The ones who suffer the most in all these crises are laborers, peasants, the poorest sectors. We told them: You must sacrifice your fair share. We say unity among countries is needed, unity among countries is needed to wage this battle. This has been the essence of the strategy we have been carrying out.

We have also said if this problem is not solved, social explosions will take place /in this country/. 1, 2, 3, or 10 can take place. Nobody knows. Nobody can prevent it. Nobody can stop social explosions. Nobody can create them. You would have to be ignorant, and willful, to believe that social explosions can be created or exported. Who would have been able to create the French Revolution in 1789? Who could have created it? Nobody created it. There were thinkers, philosophers, but objective events were the ones that [words indistinct] the French revolution explosion. The same happened in the explosion of the old czarist empire in the 1917 October Revolution.

Those objective conditions are present. Che doesn't have to say it /and that he asks for/ one, two, or three Vietnams. It would not be Vietnam because there is no longer war in Vietnam.

These things could happen if a solution is not found. We conduct our international policy based on principles and not on national interests, convenience, or any kind of opportunistic factors. We base them on principles we have been maintaining, the ones we have been defending. We can justify them.

I believe this is the difference between the time Che wrote this and now.

[Moderator] It is Ruben /Montedonico's/ turn, correspondent for EL NUEVO DIARIO.

[Castro] Do you have many more who have asked for turns?

[Moderator] About four.

[Castro] How many?

[Moderator] Four or five.

[Castro] People are going to get tired. /Not only you and me/.

[(/Montedonico/)] Commander, a U.S. Administration will end in a few days. It promised to solve the Central American conflict /to defend/ its own interests. Another one begins and the situation in Central America is even worse than in 1980. /Attacks/ on Nicaragua continue, civil war continues in El Salvador, and now Panama in being attacked. Considering this situation, what is your view on the Central American region? Thank you.

[Castro] This is a truly complex situation. It is difficult to solve. I believe nobody can predict at this time what will happen. Nicaraguans have defended themselves and have done it right. The counterrevolution has suffered. Reagan's policy failed in Nicaragua although hostility continues, efforts to encourage the dirty war continue, and efforts are being made to support the counterrevolution.

Now it will be very important to see the attitude of this new administration, to see if it insists on continuing the dirty war. I believe this is going to be one of the first tests of the so-called pragmatic spirit—which has been talked about. Will it becomes obstinate or try to negotiate?

Nicaraguans are willing to negotiate and find political solutions. They have unequivocally shown it during these/ few years/ especially lately with their courage, their ability to hold discussions, and attempts to find solutions through negotiation. I do not know if you have interviewed Daniel Ortega who was here. I imagine that he could answer this with much more knowledge/ than I can answer this question. I can only say what I know/.

Reagan's policy has failed in El Salvador. It has not been able to crush the Salvadoran revolutionaries with 8 years of enormous weapons supplies. It will be very important to see what approach the new administration is going to take on this issue, whether it wants to solve the conflict through military means or if it is willing to support political formulas and negotiating means to also find a solution to the problem in El Salvador. I believe this is also going to be a measure of /the attitude/ with which this new U.S. Administration begins. I am also talking about this, giving my views and I believe /that the Salvadorans revolutionaries themselves should outline their own views, thoughts, and proposals/. I really cannot speak for them.

We have seen another failure of the [U.S.] Administration in Panama. They wanted to wipe out the Panamanian Government. Behind all the Panamanian politics, the U.S. policy [corrects himself] regarding Panama is the notion of reverting the Torrijos-Carter treaties. Time goes by. Only 11 years are left before the Americans must leave Panama and give total control of the canal to the Panamanians. There are many reactionary people in the United States who oppose those treaties. Many people in the Reagan administration want to negate those treaties. Some people want to annul those treaties and maintain the indefinite control over the Panama Canal.

All of this hypocritical campaigning, truly hypocritical /campaign they have carried out against the Panamanian leaders/ has been inspired by this aim. The Panamanians were undestimated. What has happened is what always has happened to them. The U.S. looks at Latin Americans as worthless people who can be manipulated, who can be crushed. They have found everywhere that the mixture we have of Indians, Blacks, and Spaniards is a mixture that cannot be underestimated. It cannot be belittled. It has been proven. Cubans proved it, Nicaraguans proved it, Salvadorans proved it, and Panamanians are proving it. They are courageous people/; they are combative people/. They are not easily scared and cannot be crushed easily.

I am truly amazed at the way Panamanians have resisted despite the infernal barrage of accusations and the campaigns that have been conducted against them. Many of them are slanderous, many of them. I cannot respond to each one of the attacks, but I know for a fact that many of the accusations are slanderous.

This is typical. It is a classic aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Panama was a policy failure. I believe that Panama is also going be another test for the so-called pragmatic spirit. We will see whether they want to negotiate with Panamanians or if they insist on imposing a solution through a blockade, /intervention, and through force/.

I believe these three points are going to measure the spirit and ideas with which this new U.S. Administration will begin. You have referred to three places that are three symbols of failed U.S. policy. This policy of force has not brought them success anywhere. Perhaps they will decide on the negotiation policy. This is not the easiest way. I will tell you it is not easy, but it is the only way in which reasonable constructive solutions can be found to the problems you have mentioned.

[Moderator] The floor now goes to (Loane Basol) from the (?O ESTADO) of Sao Paulo.

[Castro] Sao Paulo.

[(Basol)] Could you make a brief analysis on Brazil-Cuba relations since the two countries resumed official relations in 1986? I have a second question. In the last Brazilian elections /important victories were achieved by socialist leaning parties, /which is going to rule the main cities in the country for the next 4 years. I ask you, what is your opinion on the rise to power of the left in large Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico?

[Castro] I am going to respond to the first question. Relations in general are going well. They are satisfactory. There has not been a large increase of trade between the two countries, but there has been a great increase in cultural relations, contacts in every sense, cooperation in the scientific field,/and even/political relations are very good. I believe that relations between Brazil and Cuba have a good outlook. It is just a matter of time.

Regarding what you said on the victories of left-wing parties, without wanting to get involved in your problems, those of the Brazilians, and speaking in general terms, I see a radicalization process in /our/ countries. Those processes are related to the objective problems I referred to before, to a a dramatic and tragic crisis in the economic and social field. I see this without having to wait for elections. I see it in our contacts with many Latin Americans. Often there are international events /for women, for instance. Hundreds upon hundreds of women get together, from almost all social sectors/. I do not see a single radical thought, a single radical attitude, a single radical spirit. This is true in the most varied social sectors because these problems are affecting everyone. Of course, they affect more the peasants, laborers, and the poorest sectors. But it also affects the middle class, professionals, /small employers, /businessmen, and many times the national industry when it is paralyzed and goes bankrupt. All these inflationary problems affect everyone, all these trade problems affect some to a greater degree and others to a lesser degree.

I have been watching—as we talked in the meetings held in Havana 1985. We are exceptional witnesses because we turned /into a sort of meter, like the created by [name indistinct], the physicist expert on distance, which is said to be preserved, with marks,/ on a bar of platinum. I still remember that. It hasn't been that long since I attended primary school and was taught those things [laughter]. We are that little bar. We measure it through the relations they have with us, the way we are treated, the way in which they exchange impressions, the way they express themselves when they go to our country. We are exceptional witnesses of that radicalization process which is taking place practically everywhere in our hemisphere. It doesn't responds to subversive plans /or campaigns, or any such thing, but actually responds to an objective situation/ in the economic and social areas and an increase of problems in these countries.

This happens not only in women's meetings. If there is a meeting of attorneys—attorneys in general do not tend to be very radical although almost all revolutionaries in various times have been attorneys. Apparently they were left without employment and a certain radicalism came up from this. Somehow they turned into /professional/ revolutionaries. Even I was an attorney. There were many others. But I see,/ I find that all of them are radicalized/.

This happens in meetings of specialists in primary medicine or in meetings of pediatricians, orthopedic specialists in private medicine and public medicine, all types. You find that they are radicalized. I see it in teachers meetings. They have met many times. I have seen them and I have even met with them. Almost always, when there is that kind of meeting in which 800, 900, 1,000 delegates or people from Latin America attend I find the teachers radicalized or a tendency .... [rephrases] They suffer. They talk with a lot of pain that there is no budget for education, that there is a shortage of teacher, that they have gone backwards. They talk with a terrible grief. Doctors tell you the same thing. They know that only a certain amount lives can be saved, so many children and more resources are needed. They react with terrible irritation against the debt, and against the economic crisis. They see it, and witness this.

If you meet with economists and you find the same radicalization process in the middle class sectors,in those professional sectors. This is a very important symptom. I was not really joking when I said this /thing about the attorneys/. All these professional and intellectual sectors are the ones who later supply the theory to revolutionary processes. This is a reality because they have more culture, more education. I see, I observe those things happening in Latin America. They are clearly coming. We are exceptional witnesses of this. We are a good ruler, a good yardstick to measure what is happening. We measure the mood and we had never seen the mood we are seeing now. This is why I am not surprised that when these kinds of situations occur the radicalization spirit is expressed in some of these electoral processes. This is what I can tell you.

[(Basol)] [Indistinct question]

[Castro] What was that?

[(Basol] [Indistinct question]

[Castro] You are better informed than I am. [laughter] What will be going on?

[(Basol)] The information we have is that you will go to Brazil on 25 /January/—to Sao Paulo—/to inaugurate the new memorial along/ with other Latin American leaders the.

[Castro] An invitation was extended to me at a local level. A Latin American memorial is going to be inaugurated. The governor of Sao Paulo visited Cuba. He talked a lot with me. He explained what they were going to do with that memorial and he invited me in a truly very pleasant way. But he is the governor of the state. That state is part of a country which is called Brazil and has a federal government. If I accepted all the invitations that are made at a local level I would be travelling all the time. There would not be enough fuel in Cuba for me to accept all invitations. [laughter]

This has to be looked at very carefully. You see that the Spaniard already invited me. [laughter] He asked me when I am going to go to Spain. He said they are waiting

for me in Spain. They have extended me many invitations for me to go to Spain. Maybe I will go to Galicia which is the land of my forefathers, of one of my forefathers. I may go and visit as a tourist. I do not want to place our friend Felipe in an embarrassing position. When he asks me to come, I will go. I will go when he invites me. This may happen sooner or later. I have plenty of work. Don't you think that I am trying to put myself in a position to want to travel all the time. [laughter]

This is what the situation is. The government has to handle it. It is known that the invitation was made. If the Brazilian Government says [rephrases] shows interest that I pay this visit, I will or I could. It is a little farther away from Mexico but it is just a few more hours away. We do not live in the time of Colombus' caravels when 3 months were needed to get to a place. In just a few hours, time goes by talking in the plane and you have already arrived. So, there is nothing certain on that. We should not put pressure or put the Brazilian Government in an embarrassing position. It is the one that has to decide when it believes it is more convenient, when it is more useful, when it considers I am not an obstacle there or cause it a lot of trouble. The Sarney government has to decide this. If it doesn't happen then it will be some other time. I have not lost hope of visiting such a marvelous country as Brazil.

[Moderator] Commander, do we have a chance for a couple more questions?

[Castro] A couple more questions.

[Moderator] The floor goes to (Almel Altuza) from the FORTIN MAPOCHO newspaper.

[Castro] From FORTIN MAPOCHO. Those people are rough. Not only the mapoche people, but the ones from this newspaper.

[(Altuza)] Commander Castro or Fidel as we called you in Chile when you went there.

[Castro] Thank you very much.

[(Altuza)] I represent the FORTIN MAPOCHO newspaper which, as you know, is the first opposition newspaper to open has opened during the dictatorship in my country. The question on behalf of so many Chileans who are struggling there deals with the following. The international community /has seen with a little/ astonishment that the Chilean opposition or the Chilean citizens who have a tradition of political struggle have opted against the dictatorship through the plebiscite as a mean of political struggle. Surely you are better informed than I, you know that the no vote won. This has brought the possibility of a democratic opening. Specifically, my question is: As a leader of a revolution which ousted a dictatorship through armed means, what is your assessment of the opposition's triumph and what would be the message you would give the Chilean citizens who favor democracy, and in particular Commander Castro, to the members of the left-wing who still remember your visit and still value your opinion?

By the way, if you allow me, you mentioned that Latin American exiles have continued working outside our countries. This is true. The only thing I know how to do is write. I have two books that I would like to give you if you allow me.

[Castro] Thank you very much.

[(Altuza)] Thank you commander.

[Castro] Marti said that a just principle from the bottom of a cave can do more than an Army. If your books are an expression of those principles they can do more than many weapons can.

I have to tell you /that the news about the No-Vote/was received in our country with a lot of joy. Coincidentally, on that same day a ceremony took place at noon in which we unveiled a bust of Salvador Allende at a hospital we were /expanding. It was a bust in the park/. A women's meeting was taking place in Havana. Many Chilean women attended. They made me speak at the ceremony. I was not scheduled to speak there but they almost forced me to say a few words. I expressed my opinion and my certainty that the people were going to vote no. It would have been against all laws of human psychology, of society, of everything, that people who have suffered this [words indistinct]. Despite the climate of terror created by Pinochet, the resources, propaganda, the fear he tried to saw among the citizens, the people were going to vote no. I said this on that day.

I believe the Chilean people had to right to use any means to get rid of Pinochet. Fifteen years are quite a lot. There have been 15 years of repression, crimes, tortures, missing people, and humiliating the people. So I would have never criticized or disagreed with those Chileans who were willing to offer an armed response to the Pinochet regime. However, this is not the only way. There was no other way for a long time. People had to resign themselves to Pinochet's presence for a long time, for and indefinite period of time. Those who were willing to sacrifice their lives deserve to be respected. Those who were willing to fight with weapons deserve to be respected. Chile's independence was also achieved with weapons. Chile has had to be defended with weapons more than once. So those men need to be respected. The justness or unjustness is not measured by success. Many times when men sacrifice themselves they are turning into a seed of something. Sooner or later they give fruit. Those who attempted to oust Pinochet by other means could not reach their goals.

Other possibilities began to appear. Pinochet was in power many years. He created a constitution, elected himself for many more years, and attempted to elect

himself for more. An alternative to oust the tyranny through voting came up. A number of factors came together. I truly believe that the secret of getting rid of Pinochet by any means—either through armed struggle or through political means—was unity. I believe that if all opposition forces got together, Pinochet would not have been there for 15 years. He would not have been there for almost 17 years [words indistinct]. Pinochet's best ally was the division of the opposition force.

A pretty broad unity level was achieved this time. If you ask my opinion, I was convinced that if Pinochet had not been ousted through other means, the possibility of ousting him through the plebiscite should not be ruled out. I was always convinced of that. I always thought all Chileans should register, that the entire left-wing sector should have registered. I expressed this point of view every time I had a chance to speak with left-wing people. Because the peoples [rephrases] even the people who favored an armed struggle [rephrases] if people cannot give a respond one way, or they don't see it, or it is not close, any other opportunity to solve the problem and get rid of the tyranny cannot be wasted. I defended this point of view many times a long time ago. Even a year before, when there was talk that a plebiscite was set for a certain date, for October, I always thought—every time I could I said it—that everyone should register. I always thought nobody should abstain. Any revolutionary,/who under such circumstances, had suggested abstension would have made a mistake, but actually /nobody mentioned it. As far as I know, the entire left-wing /left-wing registered without exception/. Even those who did not believe in the plebiscite as a solution gave the plebiscite a chance. They respected the plebiscite. They even declared a truce because of the plebiscite so Pinochet would not have the least pretext to use fraud or violence So I have witnessed, I can assure you, that everyone cooperated with the plebiscite, that all the left registered and that the left voted. An important step has been taken.

Now, let's see if... [rephrases] Pinochet is still there and is determined to stay there another year, or two. Right now, it is early December; and I think that /the elections will be held /in December. The opposition will have to use another strategy, but whatever strategy it uses will have to based on unity, and on a search for unity. Without unity, Pinochet will remain there one way or another. Therefore, they will have to unite because every battle field has its rules. War has its rules, and political means also have rules. Unity is an indispensable requirement, and I have faith that they will attain it. I also have faith that the Chilean people will not waste a single opportunity to get rid of Pinochet.

That is the message I can /relay through you /to the Chileans, now. I am not in a /position to say anything else /or else it will be said that I am a strategist saying what needs to be done in Chile, and I don't want that role.

[Moderator] Now, it is (Carlos Casio's) turn from the /AP press,/ and PROCESSO magazine.

[(Casio)] Commander, this afternoon you said that you are in Mexico, and in Quito, as a symptom of the times in Latin America. You said that if there aren't reforms, there will be revolution or coups d'etat. You also said that Cuba holds a constructive role on the continent's position. I think that based on this position, the Group of Eight, which met in Acapulco a year ago, spoke about Cuba's reentry in the hemisphere's community, and of the reentry into a reformed OAS. We know that within the framework of the SELA [Latin American Economic System], Cuba is participating in a new joint scheme that could end up in a north-south hemisphere dialogue between Cananda and the United States as the north, and our America /to use Marti's words/. How do you view this process which is also developing within the framework of continental integration? I would like for you to tell me how Cuba is participating in this, what prospects do you see in this, and what characterizes an integration which will benefit the masses, and not only oligarchies, or businesses? And a second question?

[Castro interrupting] You (?have) another question?

[(Casio)] Just a very short one. Thirty-four years ago you met here in Mexico with Che. I would like you to make a quick reference to that /meeting/.

[Castro] Well, I am going to need a book to answer your questions. They include many very interesting subjects. I think I have already partially answered some /of these questions/. You said that I had said that there would be outbreaks and coups d'etat. What I have said is that during this process of democratic openness, I do not see much of a danger of coups d'etat but /rather /a danger of social outbreaks. I did not say this because I am excluding the possibilities for coups d'etat for any particular country. I said this because objective conditions are so difficult that the military should think a little. They should think. They avoid the responsibility of taking charge of the state. It used to be in many countries that with one fourth of the problems which exist today — strikes, what today is called disorder, chaos, and anarchy—it would have been enough to take charge of the government. Many of these problems occur today (?and) the military doesn't show the slightest enthusiasm in taking charge of the government because societies are becoming ungovernable, unmanageable. Even the military in some countries is afraid that their intervention would aggravate and worsen the problems, as well as accelerate outbreaks. That is why, from the military's point of view, the problem does not appear as imminent as it used be in other times.

In fact, there is a new epoc which reflects all these things that we have talked about in these meetings. These meetings are good, such as the meetings of the Group of Eight, the meeting in Uruguay. They are positive steps, but they are not enough. They are not broad enough. I

believe that they must find a mechanism,/through which they can obtain /the representation of all Latin American countries/,such as a general/ meeting or some other type; they will have to find some mechanism. With regards to this, we have defended the concept of broad [representation]. No one should be excluded. It should be like the United Nations. When the heads of state or the Nonaligned meet in the United Nations, the most diverse political personalities meet. If they want to exclude someone, well... [rephrases] I belive that if someone wants to exclude himself, let him do it. Let him exclude himself, but no one should be excluded.

I am merely suggesting that the Group of Eight which is acting as a leader in this /battle/, should act as a representative of the whole hemisphere. It should look for a way in which to obtain that representation and then to discuss and hold talks with the United States on behalf of all Latin America. That is the point of view we hold so that it has greater /strength/.

You also mentioned the OAS. We do not have a /dogmatic/ position with regards to that. The OAS was an instrument of the United States against Cuba. However, it was an instrument at a time when there was a lot of submission in Latin America, when no one in Latin America would dare to say no to the United States. Today, there are many countries who dare say no to the United States. We have seen it in international types of battles. These are the same kinds of battles fought by the United States to condemn us, such as in Geneva, with its wicked charges on the subject of human rights. The United States found itself before a firm decision by Latin American governments. It was not able to handle, manipulate it. It applied tremendous pressure.

When there is secret voting, we do not have problems. Everything turns out well for Cuba when the voting is secret. Recognizing what Cuba has done and Cuba's set of principles, people vote [accordingly]. However, when the voting is public, things turn out very bad because the Government of the United States applies a lot of pressure. The United States, [for example], has the key vote on a World Bank credit, in a negotiation with the IMF, or with the Inter-American Bank—or I think it's called the Inter-American Bank for Development. The United States has the final word in many organizations /when/ credit must be obtained for food, etcetera. Through our own experience, we know that when we must face the United States in open voting, the battle is very difficult. Governments would have to be almost suicidal if they vote against what the United States wants. Despite that, however, a very high number of Latin American governments have opposed that maneuver. They /opposed the maneuver to pit Cuba against Latin American again and to sow discord among us/. I should say Mexico had an excellent attitude. It did not hesitate one bit during those battles. It did not hesitate a bit when the United States made this attempt, this maneuver against Cuba. /The Latin American governments no longer do what the United States tells them to do/. At least many governments do not comply with U.S. orders. They have refused to continue complying with its orders.

When Cuba was expelled from the OAS, or it was suspended—I don't know how to call what they did—when we were denied of the right to participate in the OAS, /Latin America/ was totally dominated by the United States and totally obeyed it. Some resisted more and others less. Finally, all but Mexico accepted. Those times have changed. The United States can no longer use the OAS as an instrument. Even though many islands, former British colonies... [rephrases] the number has increased. Those countries with very weak economies are more easily controlled by the United States. Not all, but many of them depend—small countries with a small population—depend heavily on the United States. Many of those British Caribbean islands were not independent at the time. The United States can no longer manage the OAS at will. There is a new situation.

We receive with satisfaction, we appreciate the agreements and efforts made by the Group of Eight countries defending Cuba's right to participate in the OAS. We do not have a dogmatic attitude on this. If the OAS is of no use it is not worth being there. If the OAS can be useful, if Latin American governments believe it is of some value, and can be a useful instrument, and they consider it is convenient and positive for us to join, then we will take into account those points of view and we will be willing to accept the view of Latin American governments without any kind of dogmatism. So there is no dogma for us. We analyzed it in light of how useful, how convenient, how positive it could be to be in that institution now that the Latin American countries cannot be managed by the United States as it managed them at another time.

I believe that with this I respond to part of what you say. I need to answer to the last part. I can tell you that I did indeed meet Che when I traveled to Mexico in 1955. I believe it was in June when I traveled. I had been in prison. Batista, with his political games, had to agree to the demand to grant amnesty to the prisoners sentenced for the attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1953. When I arrived here, several of our comrades were here. Raul, Raul Castro, my brother, was already here. He had traveled several weeks before. Other Cubans were here and they had gotten together with Che. When we arrived here we started to hear about Che, an Argentine physician. He was called Che because all Argentines are called Che. This is when Che started to be called this. /And at the home of Maria Antonia, a female Cuban comrade who lived in (Ampalan 19). There must be someone around here who remembers. [Unidentified speaker says "49."] Yes, 49. It is not too far, well,/ I don't know where it was [laughter] but it was close to Reforma/on a small street there/. That is where some Cubans were arriving. We met Che a few days after we arrived. He writes about it in a letter when he left Cuba.

Che became very popular among us. He became very dear to us. Che already had a very solid political education. He had studied Marxism. He liked to study a lot, he had a lot of depth. All this was more reason for us to become closer. Although we did not have a socialist program yet, a group of our movement's leaders already had a Marxist education. This was not the immediate program our movement had, because it would have not been the appropriate time. Objective and subjective conditions were not present for such a program. This is why /this program is/ the Moncada program. Anyone who reads it can see /that it was the forerunner/ of a socialist revolution.

We spoke very clearly, but many people did not believe in programs because there had been so many programs in the world, and so many unfulfilled programs. People said many things. Some people said that we were young kids, so they did not even pay much attention to the Moncada program. However, Che did like it. He was interested in it.

He came from Guatemala. He was very bitter, and had suffered a lot from what had happened in Guatemala. He was there during the (Arbenz) administration when the CIA intervention occurred which overthrew the government. He was very enthusiastic about the social movement, the reforms that had taken place, the agrarian reforms, but he returned with all that disappointment. So, when he saw a group of Cubans who were planning a revolution in Cuba—the return to Cuba to fight against Batista—he became enthusiastic and immediately offered his services as a volunteer and became part of our group.

At that time he was a doctor. I think he worked at the Cardiology Institute. He did some research /and was very studious/. Another very typical thing about Che was that every week he would try to climb the Popocatepetl [volcano], he called it the Popo. He would never reach the top, but he tried it every week. I think this is something beautiful which reflects Che's character and spirit. He had allergies and asthma. Just imagine what an attempt it was for him to climb the Popocatepetl. Although, Mexico because of its/altitude and dry climate, back/ then there was also more oxygen [laughter], less industry, and less problems like the ones that the ecologists call air pollution. Ever since we met, he would go there almost every Sunday. He would get half way there, /go further up, and not get to the top in end,/ but he would try it again. This was proof of his character, perseverance, and tenacity.

This is how he joined us, and he gave his body and soul as he would always do /totally devoting himself to the tasks he had to do/. He trained with us. He was very inspiring. We trained legally at the firing ranges. There was a firing range called /Los Ramitos/ where we would train, and we did not violate the law by doing this. Although, I have had to admit, with all honesty, that we did commit technical violations of the law because we were getting organized and obtaining arms. However, they were not moral violations nor political violations of Mexican law. We also did not carry out any activity against the Mexican Government. With regards to that, we maintained the tradition of Cubans—the Cubans who fought for our independence, and all the generations of revolutinaries who preceded them. So, to sum it up, we practiced at the firing range. Che was a good marksman. We were specialized in [word indistinct], and he was a good marksman, very dedicated. He trained with a lot of discipline, and he was known for that.

However, back then no one saw in Che the great soldier he was; he was seen as the doctor of our expedition. Che was /already a communist, but his exceptional qualities made him a great soldier from the first moment, one of whose characteristics was total, instant devotion. If there is one more thing I have to add is the following: /When he joined our movement, for you to get an idea of a premonition... [shifts thought] How many obstacles did we have to overcome to gather the necessary means, to embark, arrive, fight the war, and finish victoriously? Che was someone who constantly would take chances with life. You had to stop him so that he would not take so many chances. He was always the first volunteer for any difficult task.

He would tell me: I only want one thing: that when we finish the struggle in Cuba, I can then go to my country to fight. For reasons of state we/could not do that. see how long it has been. /We had just met him, and he joined us. I promised him that for no reason in the world or reason of state would we prevent him from returning to his country. That is precisely the basis of what occurred afterwards. /We would have liked him to wait longer./ We would have liked for him to play the role of /tactician he began playing in the guerilla unit he organized. But he had this idea for a long time/. We keep our word. So he made the decision to [words indistinct] even the enemy wrote lies about him lies.

We suffered so much when Che left and left the letter which we couldn't publish. To publish it would have been /to warn about/and increase the risks that he could be intercepted on his way. He had /gained some time in a mission in Africa. [sentence as heard] We kept the letter for a long time. Campaigns and false accusations started to circulate to the effect that we had problems with Che, that Che had /been murdered, that Che had disappeared, that Che had been gotten rid of. We put up with many of those kinds of campaigns until the day we were able to publish the letter, and the day on which all the truth became known.

Since you asked me, I have had the opportunity to recall this pleasant memory. I don't think I have ever said these things publicly.

What is happening? Are we running out of time?

[Moderator] Commander, /we have a request from Imevision. They want to ask a question/.

[Castro] [Words indistinct] an interview becomes so long, it becomes a bad interview. One becomes tired [words indistinct] [laughter] I think they will understand if we /refrain from taking any more questions/.

[Moderator] Well comrades [applause], I think it's time to (?leave) I would like to thank the President [words indistinct due to applause].

U.S. Guantanamo Naval Base Examined

FL2012152688 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 12 Dec 88

["Wide Angle" program on U.S. Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, hosted by journalist Pedro Martinez Pirez; all speakers identified by caption—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Martinez Pirez] When the world was marking the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December, we were remembering that the physical occupation of the territory in Guantanamo by the Americans for their naval base in Caimanera also took place on a 10 December, in 1903. This is why "Wide Angle" is today a program on the Guantanamo Naval Base, which is a dagger in the heart of the Cuban land. [passage omitted includes unidentified speaker explaining the area covered by Guantanamo base]

[Martinez Pirez] Is the treaty perpetual? Is a perpetual treaty legal in international law?

[Olga Miranda, director of legal affairs of the Foreign Ministry] The question you ask me is a very interesting one. You have not been the only one who has been asked this question. I have been asked many times when the agreement on the base ends. First, let me tell you that there is no single agreement on the base. We speak of an agreement on the base, but there are really three agreements on the base. The first agreement, the main one, is the one signed on 16 and 23 February 1903; the second agreement, or the complementary one—it is called a complementary agreement—was signed on 2 July 1903. These two agreements don't rule only over Guantanamo during the early years, but also over the other spot, which was a U.S. base, Bahia Honda. The 1903 agreement is signed under Article 7.7 of the famous Platt Amendment.

The United States proclaimed the right to have [word indistinct] or naval stations in Cuba through this amendment by way of sale or rental. The rental form was finally used. The legal nature of rental is essentially temporary. Rental cannot be perpetual. However, the United States in this document—which is full of faults which make it legally null from the beginning—uses an open-ended rental concept to cover up a form of perpetuity. [passage omitted includes unidentified speaker describing geographical area of the base]

[Martinez Pirez] Dr Kauztman, as one of history's coincidences, the United States took over on 10 December 1903 the area they currently occupy in Guantanamo. On 10 December in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed. That is, the 40th anniversary of the declaration is being marked. As an attorney, do you think that the permanent stay in Guantanamo constitutes a type of violation of human rights against Cuba?

[Dr Victor Kauztman, deputy director of legal affairs of the Foreign Ministry] Events have taken place in the Guantanamo Naval Base that are very offensive to our sovereignty. Bloody things have happened there. Cubans have been killed on the base. There are cases in which they have been tortured. Violations of human rights have also been included among the myriad of illegal stances and activities. These events involve the personal safety and the lives of Cubans who have worked on the base.

[Begin video clip showing Rafael Cabrera Anido, former employee at Guantanamo Naval Base] I do remember that it happened... [rephrases] I think they weren't grateful. The worker was really mistreated there, especially the Latin American worker, the Cuban, the Puerto Rican.

[Unidentified reporter] Did you used to come here, to Caimaneras, during that time?

[Cabrera] Yes. For 18 years, I crossed the bridge that you see here.

[Unidentified reporter] Do you remember anything in particular that occurred during those 18 years?

[Cabrera] Yes. I can't forget the case of Manuel Prieto Gomez, who was savagely mistreated at the base. [end video clip]

[Begin video clip of Manuel Prieto Gomez] I was savagely tortured. They broke three of my ribs. Then they transferred me to a prison called (Carabela Point). In (Carabela Point) I was thrown in a small, dark cell; then I was transferred twice to other cells. Because of the activities that were carried out here in the town of Caimaneras, my family was able to get on the base. The Americans tried to get me to denounce all those comrades who belonged to the 26 July [group], which they weren't able to do. Thanks to the actions my wife and my children carried out inside the base, my family was able to get me out of the base. As a result of those injuries and the ulcer I got because I went without eating for 3 days, I had to be hospitalized. I was in the Guantanamo

Hospital for approximately 1 month. I walked out of here with orthopedic equipment which I had to use for 11 months. [end video clip] [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] Suarez [addressing in-studio guest Lic Luis Suarez], in your opinion, what is the role of the Guantanamo Naval Base in the Cuban-U.S. dispute? In other words, this is what can be called the Cuban-U.S. dispute which could also be defined as the U.S. aggression policy against Cuba.

[Suarez, director of the American Studies Center, identified by caption] Undoubtedly, the problem of the Guantanamo Naval Base is part of the agenda of global security issues which Cuba and the United States would have to discuss with (?prospects) for a negotiated solution to this, which has been called the dispute by the United States. Obviously, the subject of Guantanamo is not the only subject on that agenda. The subject of Guantanamo must be included in the subject of the blockade and other security issues, such as the assassination attempts of revolution leaders. It must be included in subjects related to the violation of our air and naval space, and in [the subject of] the introduction of plagues and diseases in Cuban territory.

Therefore, in any analysis the subject of the Guantanamo Naval Base must be incorporated into a global discussion of the management and development of relations between Cuba and the United States. Furthermore, the research that has been carried out in our center—especially by Comrade Rafael Hernandez, our North America Department chief—shows statistically the way in which the increase in violations, aggressions, and hostilities of the Guantanamo Naval Base coincide, specifically, with [the fact] that this aggressiveness and hostility is expressesed in other facets of the relations between Cuba and the United States. If one looks at the graphs done by collegue Hernandez, one can see how between the years 1962 and 1965 there was an increase in the number of aggressions by the base—to the extent of the murder of border guards. After a plateau phase in the occurence of these events, this aggressiveness reappears at the beginning of the first period of the Ronald Reagan administration. Therefore, all the aspects related to the Guantanamo Naval Base are also integral parts of the possible solution, or of the necessary negotiated solution, to the historical Cuban dispute with the United States. [passage omitted includes video clips of military observation post and a jeep making rounds of a base. Another clip shows a funeral procession]

[Martinez Pirez] From the point of view of international law, it is clear that Guantanamo is unsustainable [insostenible]. This is so because of the way in which the U.S. military presence was imposed on Cuba—the opportunistic interference of the United States in the Cuban-Spanish War, the imposition of the Platt Amendment. So, in your opinion, what military value could the naval base have now?

[Suarez] Look, the Guantanamo Naval Base has been loosing and (?lowering) its military value in a permanent way. It cannot be confirmed that it is not a useful base for certain interests and missions of the U.S. Navy. However, strictly as a military base, practically everyone realizes that it is an obsolete installation. It is quite vulnerable, given the decrease... [rephrases] given the small value in total strength. It can also be perfectly substituted for by naval operations carried out from Puerto Rico, specifically from the Roosevelt Roads base. They are also carried out from U.S. territory itself, such as the bases on Key West, other Florida bases, and from the Bahamas territory, as well as other air and naval bases which are on U.S. continental territory. Therefore, the whole U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean zone—a deployment with its naval power which has increased, of course, as part of the hostilities against Cuba, the Sandinist revolution, and the Central American crisis as a whole—can substitute, from a military point of view, for the functions that the Guantanamo Naval Base could carry out.

An important fact which confirms this is that the Guantanamo Naval Base forces have participated in neither of the two warlike military events that the United States—based on its interventionist policy—has carried out in the Caribbean in the past few years. They did not intervene in the military occupation of Santo Domingo nor in the military occupation of Grenada. So, without denying its usefulness, the relative importance of this military installation has been decreasing. This has also been recognized by many U.S. military theoreticians and scientists.

[Martinez Pirez] Therefore, if the value is not military, it is political?

[Suarez] Obviously.

[Martinez Pirez] Why?

[Suarez] I think we would have to look at the reasons from different points of view. From a general perspective, in the United States there is a tendency to believe that the Guantanamo military base is an issue [preceding word in English] for negotiations with Cuba. Here is the Guantanamo Naval Base—in a time of negotiations, they could be ready to withdraw this base in exchange for certain Cuban concessions. I think we all recall, and my colleague Rafael Hernandez recalls from his research, that during the crisis of October 1962 that problem was also discussed by U.S. strategists. Kennedy's administration also evaluated the possibility of holding that discussion. The circumstances under which the solution to the October crisis was reached did not lead to a more in-depth consideration of this. We all remember the response... [rephrases] the five points, the proposed [word indistinct] by Commander Fidel Castro at that time.

It is a matter that could be perfectly negotiable in the search for a solution to our differences with the United States. I repeat, there are even U.S. citizens, including intellectuals, politicians, and even U.S. military personnel, who look at it this way. However, they see the Guantanamo Naval Base as a possible pressure point at a time of negotiations with Cuba. Of course, those who think of U.S. policy from a position of force see the symbolic value of staying there against the will of the Cuban people, by occupying a piece of their territory. They incorporate that element in the framework of a hostile global policy against Cuba, as we have already noted. This is a policy which in present times has been revived with radio transmissions and with eventual television transmissions—aggressive and unilateral transmissions by the United States against the Cuban territory. [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] What are these old documents about? What are these documents that you have taken out of the vaults of the Cuban Foreign Ministry?

[Unidentified speaker] From a historical point of view, we have here four very important documents. This first one is the permanent Cuba-U.S. treaty. It was signed on 22 May 1903; it is an exact replica of the Platt Amendment. We also have here the two agreements signed in 1913 on the installation of the Guantanamo Naval Base and Bahia Honda. This first agreement established the basis for the rental and fixed the limits of both bases. The other agreement, also found in this portfolio, signed on 2 July 1903, established the regulations of an administrative, internal character, which we could say regulated this rental. It also fixed an annual price for the rental which consisted of 2,000 pesos in gold, in U.S. currency [as heard]. It also established another series of regulations dealing with public order, internal limits, setting up fences, and other things.

Finally, the agreement of 29 May 1934 annuls the permanent agreement of 22 May 1903 and states the rent conditions for the naval base in Guantanamo. These are documents which are kept at the Cuban ministry and which, obviously, have great importance from a historical standpoint because it shows how the U.S. Government imposed its wishes, not only with the base, but other interventionist aspects and criteria that permanently damaged our independence and our sovereignty for decades. [passage omitted]

[Suarez] Some sectors in the United States have said that the U.S. base could become a Soviet base. What do you think about that?

[Unidentified speaker] With relation to Cuba's sovereignty, Cuba is supposed to be able to do with its territory whatever it considers important or necessary for the defense and upkeep of its national security. In theory, Cuba would have every right to convert the Guantanamo Naval Base into one of its own bases, or a military base of a country allied with and friendly to Cuba.

However, I do not think this is in keeping with Cuba's nonaligned policies. The logic of Cuba's nonaligned policies also opposes the keeping of foreign military bases in our country. Cuban policies make a very close connection between peace and development. Given a situation which would guarantee peace in the region, I think it would be more useful for Cuba to use the base's facilities to help in the development of one of the island's most rural areas, which is the area of Guantanamo Province.

On the other hand, it would not make any sense, any common sense, to think that Cuba has to wait for the United States to withdraw from Guantanamo to set up a Soviet naval base. If that were the intention of the Cuban Government, it could use any other part of the country and come to an agreement to establish a Soviet naval base. I think this is an absurd argument that is being manipulated to support U.S. public opinion, certain political ploys, or euphamisms so as to deflect from the true role and place that the Guantanamo situation has in Cuba-U.S. relations. [Narrator shows on map area where air and naval units are located on the base] [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] Suarez: Being in the American Studies Center, you have much contact with U.S. university professors, sociologists, and political scientists. What do they say on the matter of Guantanamo?

[Suarez] Well, in general the prevailing view among U.S. academicians and social scientists with whom we analyze and discuss the topic of Cuba-U.S. relations is that the problem of Guantanamo can be resolved by global negotiations with the United States on the Cuba dispute.

The nature of the problem is not such that the United States could not include it at the negotiating table, because of the factors we have stated. It is a base that has no military importance. It is useful but has no importance, no strategic military value. It is something that can easily be included in negotiations.

Some have even thought that once the United States withdraws from the Guantanamo Naval Base agreements can be reached so that those facilities can be used for tasks that can be mutually beneficial to the United States and Cuba, such as hurricane control. Some have even stated that it could be used as a base to monitor drug trafficking which originates in the United States.

The academic sectors are considering and looking for certain ideas that may one day resolve this problem in relations, with a total improvement in relations between Cuba and the United States.

[Martinez Pirez] There is something that does call one's attention. Almost all points—I would say almost all points—of the so-called Cuba-U.S. dispute began in 1959, forming part of the basis of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Nevertheless, the Guantanamo Naval Base is 85 years old. Is it fair, correct, or logical to include it in the agenda of that dispute, to include a historic act of that nature?

[Suarez] Well, Martinez Pirez, I think that the dispute, which began in 1959, has profound historic roots. I think we cannot understand this dispute and the points of the 1959 dispute if we are not familiar with the history of relations between Cuba and the United States, if we are not basically familiar with the United States' historic interest in converting Cuba. First of all, the United States wanted to annex Guantanamo to U.S. territory. They later wanted to place Cuba virtually in a colonial position. Then, until the triumph of the revolution, the United States wanted to convert Cuba into a neo-colony.

The total problem of the Guantanamo Naval Base is incorporated into the great historic injustices committed by the United States against the Cuban people. This is why a revolution emerged in 1959 which stated that one of its first tasks was to rescue national sovereignty and break the ties of dependence, on all levels, that linked the country to the United States.

I don't separate the dispute into two parts. I think that the topics of this dispute may have changed but, historically, these changes have been guided by an essential problem which is that the United States has not wanted and does not want to recognize, as an essential factor, the will and sovereignty of the Cuban people to independently determine their own social, economic, and political development. [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] What does the American Studies Center expect from the new U.S. Administration, especially on the topic of Guantanamo?

[Suarez] This is a rather complicated topic because we're discussing predictions. The Bush administration has not yet taken a stance or begun to develop its policy.

However, after analyzing documents that have come into our possession from the different seminars we have held here to share and analyze our opinions with U.S. academicians and social scientists, we feel it is possible that the Bush administration will try to apply new methods in its policy toward Cuba. When I say new methods, I want to stress that this would not mean a change in their objectives. Instead, they would seek new ways to confront what has been Cuba's challenge to U.S. policy.

There are even some who call these new methods a democratic subversion. They begin by antagonizing Cuba with topics or they continue to antagonize Cuba with such topics as human rights or democracy. They use those topics that certain people feel have possibilities for internal subversion in the country. They overestimate the importance that those little groups or those isolated demonstrations have on destabilizing Cuba's internal political situation. They attempt to play the so-called card of Cuba's weakness in responding to this and other challenges presented to U.S. policy.

This is why we can expect new methods, new variations of this type of aggression to appear in the arsenal of U.S. attacks against Cuba. I think that the Cuban authorities will have to prepare themselves to give the appropriate response in each case.

I don't think that the topic of the Guantanamo Naval Base will play a role different than what it has been playing in Cuba's agenda with the United States. Perhaps, as has occurred during the second half of the Reagan administration, the harassment, the violations that take place at the Guantanamo base will not change, will not increase. The Bush administration may be challenged to find new formulas, methods that have as yet not been applied in relations with Cuba because the methods that were previously applied seem to indicate to everyone that the results expected have not been attained. In some cases, they have become contradictory elements, negative factors to the positions the United States was seeking. [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] During the entire democratic campaign, no statement was issued on the Cuba-U.S. dispute or the illegal presence of the United States in Guantanamo itself, right?

[Suarez] The general topic of U.S. policy toward Latin America—and I include relations between Cuba and the United States in the U.S. policy toward Latin America—is one that got little mention in the U.S. electoral campaign. It was not a central topic of the campaign. The topic of Cuba was also not a central topic of the presidential campaign. All of us who followed the U.S. electoral process [words indistinct] very few of the problems that today preoccupy humanity were discussed by the two presidential candidates.

Nevertheless, all the documents that were drafted—or a large part of the documents that have been drafted—in relation to what can become the future policy of the United States toward Latin America in one way or another include the problem of Cuba. Once again, this reflects what we were saying before. They need to change their methods, to find a different way of relating to Cuba. This is an implicit way of recognizing the failure of the methods applied up to the moment in this matter.

Unfortunately, a sort of internal political consensus has been formed in the United States that not only includes the Republicans, but also the Democrats—certain sectors of the Democrats—in the sense that they feel they must continue to antagonize Cuba but with different methods. They feel that they must continue to promote

internal subversion in Cuba, which Reagan at one time described as the liberalization of the Cuban model. He was convinced that the other facet of the policy, the rollback [preceding word in English], did not work. The Cuban people have made it inefficient, ineffective, and very costly during the past 20 years. [passage omitted]

[Martinez Pirez] When did you first learn of the Guantanamo Naval Base? What memories do you have of it?

[Suarez] I first learned of the Guantanamo Naval Base when I was very young, because I was born in Guantanamo. I was raised in Guantanamo. I was in Guantanamo during my entire youth. I experienced the impact that the naval base and the military presence had on all of Guantanamo's society. Its presence was felt in the way the Marines behaved when they came to Guantanamo during their days on leave. Their presence was almost an offense to society. Their presence prostituted certain sectors of the population of Guantanamo and Caimanera. The absence of other available sources of employment prior to the triumph of the revolution determined that much of the work, many of the jobs, were directly related to the base or to the prostitution of important zones of the Guantanamo society.

I say important zones because sometimes people only think about open prostitution in Guantanamo, which was undoubtedly obvious. There was an enormous number of prostitutes in Guantanamo and Caimanera simply to satisfy the demands of the Marines when they went out on pass [preceding word in English].

However, I remember sectors of Guantanamo's society that prostituted themselves in other ways. They took their daughters to parties on the weekends in Guantanamo to look for the miracle of a marriage with an official or with a U.S. Marine. In this way their social status would rise. This occurred among certain middle sectors, as they are called in modern terms, of Guantanamo's society. This was something conspicuous. They would go to the base. Once on base, they would offer their daughters to marry a U.S. Marine officer. This was also an example of the type of prostitution to which I referred among certain sectors of the society of Guantanamo. It pertains not only to the vulgar, well-known type of prostitution.

I saw this when I was very young. I suffered it when I was very small. I suffered it. I also had to suffer—for a good reason, but at the time it seemed like torture to me—by studying English as a child. At the time it appeared to be the only possibility available for a young person from Guantanamo. Once becoming a professional, it was the the only way of finding a decent job. One would work as a professional, a skilled worker, a technician on the Guantanamo Naval Base since it did not have a work force that could respond to their demands. I think this is also among those problems I was discussing.

Guantanamo was a fishing zone. It was not one of the largest in the country but it was a very significant fishing zone for the economy of the area. That fishing zone has been virtually eliminated due to the hostility against the Cuban fishermen which has occurred over a long period of time. This results from the underdevelopment, the relative backwardness of that region [words indistinct] revolutionaries in Guantanamo, as well as in Caimanera.

[Martinez Pirez] Fidel Castro denounced the United States for illegally being in Guantanamo and violating national sovereignty. He also accuses them of being the direct cause of the underdevelopment of Guantanamo because that bay, which is one of the important bays of our country, has not been able to develop because it is occupied by the United States.

Suarez, would Cuba win or lose if they took the case of Guantanamo to international organizations?

[Suarez] I think that battle is virtually won. There are a large number of states, international communities that have explicitly condemned the U.S. military presence in Guantanamo against the will of the people of Guantanamo. It has been included in resolutions issued by certain movements, such as the nonaligned countries. The Third World has become a greater force in the international community and it has also become another force to discuss this matter.

There are other sectors that have condemned this, not just from the Third World. I haven't mentioned the socialist countries. There are even some sectors from developed capitalist countries that would be willing to consider Cuba's position, which is strictly founded on the principle of public international law and (?constitutional) law.

Without a doubt, I think this offers Cuba an appropriate setting to raise each time with more emphasis the demand for the unconditional return of Guantanamo to Cuban national sovereignty. [passage omitted]

Various Cooperation, Trade Protocols Signed

ANAP, UNAG Sign Accord

FL2012171988 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1527 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] The continued strengthening of revolutionary relations between the Cuban and Nicaraguan farmers has been consolidated by the signing of an agreement between the ANAP [National Association of Small Farmers] and the National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen of Nicaragua, UNAG .

The document was signed by Orlando Lugo Fonte, Central Committee member and ANAP president, and Ariel Bucardo Orroche, vice president of the Nicaraguan institution at the headquarters of the Cuban organization.

The protocol has seven points that deal with increased cooperation between the organizations. This cooperation will include the exchanging of experts, producers, farm directors, and some students in their respective fields.

The protocol also calls for seminars and courses to be held in Cuba for Nicaraguan Cooperative members. The courses will include cultivation techniques, (?viral) sanitary attention, and veterinary medicine.

Agreement With Angola

FL2012150388 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] A cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba and the Ministry of External Relations of the People's Republic of Angola has been signed in Havana City.

For the Cuban part, Isidoro Malmierca, minister of foreign relations signed the document, and for the Angolan part, Afonso Van Dunem, minister of external relations, signed.

Protocol With Romania

FL2112030288 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2041 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Representatives from Cuba and Romania signed in Bucharest today the trade protocol for 1989 with a 10-percent-higher exchange volume compared to that of this year.

Switzerland Accord Extended

FL2112032588 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 0302 GMT 21 Dec 88

[Text] The extension protocol of the trade agreement between the governments of the Republic of Cuba and the Swiss Confederation was signed in the Foreign Ministry in Havana today. Jose Raul Viera, acting foreign minister of Cuba, and (Katerine Sab), charge d'affaire and acting ambassador of the Swiss Confederation, signed the document, which extends once more the agreement signed in March 1954. The trade agreement between the two countries has been extended every year since 1956. It will be extended again in 1989 if the agreement is maintained.

The acting foreign minister noted Cuba's wish to continue to develop political and economic relations with the Swiss Confederation. (Katerine Sab) described the current extension as an expression of the consistency of trade between the two regions.

El Salvador

FMLN Reportedly Attacks Ilopango Air Base

PA2012175588 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1727 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Unattributed "last-minute report"; place not given]

[Text] It was learned in this capital that at 1105 today the FMLN initiated an attack against the Salvadoran Air Force at Ilopango Air Base, in the Salvadoran capital itself.

Those are the initial details contained in a report that colleagues from Radio Farabundo Marti sent us from El Salvador.

Confirmed by 'Official Sources'

PA2012182088 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1745 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Report by Carlos Mario Marquez]

[Text] Official sources have confirmed to YSU that there was mortar fire directed at the Salvadoran Air Force installations. They said the number of wounded people could not be determined following the attack by FMLN urban command units that used catapults [catapultas] and fired mortar shells. It was also reported that three car bombs were parked near the Air Force installations: one near the Inteca factory, another close to the Ilopango Fire Department's Second Section, and another at the entrance of the city of Ilopango, all of which are around the Salvadoran Air Force installations.

The people of Ilopango are very worried. So far, the authorities are only confirming that there was property damage at the Air Force installations, located 9 km east of the capital.

It was also noted that these installations are on the western side of the city of Ilopango, on the outskirts of San Salvador.

Venceremos Reports Attack

PA2112032088 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 21 Dec 88

[Text] Attention Salvadoran people, workers, peasants, and government workers who are struggling for their rights. Today, 20 December, an FMLN urban guerrilla unit staged a bold attack on the headquarters of the Duartist regime's Air Force. The explosions could be heard inside and outside the installations of the criminal Air Force of the Duartist regime from approximately 1000. The attack was carried out with artillery fire. At the same time car bombs were placed near the Air Force installations.

Preliminary reports indicate that at least 18 [words indistinct] Air Force paratroopers and personnel were burned and 15 others were wounded by shrapnel. Preliminary reports indicate there was a total of 33 casualties in the artillery attack on the headquarters of the criminal Duartist Air Force. We are waiting for official reports from the comrade urban guerrillas in San Salvador. [Words indistinct] we send our greetings to the comrade urban guerrillas who staged this bold operation in full daylight [words indistinct] in the capital, San Salvador. The Air Force, one of the most hated branches, [words indistinct] has been attacked by our urban guerrillas. In this way, we have begun to avenge the blood of hundreds of peasants, children, women, and old people who have been killed by the criminal bombings and strafing by the Duartist Air Force. (?This is just) the beginning; we will not rest until justice has been done to these criminals.

Col Ponce Says Duarte Must Decide on Truce

PA2012144788 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpts] The FMLN today proposed a 10-day truce throughout the country during the Christmas holidays, thus heeding a request by the country's union, political, and religious sectors. [passage omitted]

For his part, Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, chief of the Armed Forces Joint General Staff, has responded to the rebel proposal by noting that a decision on a truce can only be made by President Duarte.

Col Ponce said that an agreement on a cease-fire with the FMLN is a decision that must be made by the executive branch only:

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] As an armed institution, we have the constitutional duty to obey. However, past experience tells us the FMLN can announce unilateral truces but the guerrillas do not respect them.

They recently announced a truce for the 18th OAS General Assembly; however, they harassed several (?of our) positions in San Vicente and Santa Ana.

The civilian death toll did decrease over that 5-day truce period, 13-18 November: One person was killed in a holdup in El Salvador Department and two died in Santa Ana, but they were involved in common crimes. [end recording]

Ponce assessed the military situation. He said the FMLN is militarily weak and that it is now involved in low-level actions that directly affect the civilian population:

[Begin recording] We are in this situation because we are facing an international communist aggression. We are facing a constant threat from subversion. However, I believe the FMLN has regressed in its revolutionary

process. Consequently, because of a lack of popular support in the urban and rural areas, it has resorted to classical terrorist actions. The FMLN actions are indiscriminate and selective.

Regarding this selective terrorism, I can mention the death of eight mayors. [end recording]

According to Ponce, the assassination of mayors is a clear sign that the FMLN continues to oppose a democratic process. The Army will therefore carry out actions to stop the killing of people selected by the rebels.

He denied that the Armed Forces have formed a counterinsurgency plan as the FMLN claims.

Details 1988 Successes

PA2112044588 San Salvador Canal Seis Television in Spanish 0200 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, Armed Forces chief of staff, today issued a general report on military actions during 1988, which, according to him, was a good year for the Army. Col Ponce said the Armed Forces will change their tactics and increase counterinsurgency actions throughout the country. He also asserted that the guerrillas are worn out.

[Begin Ponce recording] We carried out 35 small, 11 medium, and 5 large military operations. We also carried out 18 long-term operations and 31 airborne operations.

We also implemented the Walker plan five times this year. We set up convoys on 39 occasions to benefit 181,250 persons. We carried out 6,345 missions to provide security for public transportation vehicles. In five military operations we guarded gasoline stations, telephone company offices, [words indistinct].

We carried out 851 missions to reestablish electric services. During the March elections, we carried out 262 missions so that all citizens could exercise their right to vote. We carried out 72,440 patrols and staged 45,826 ambushes. This resulted in 2,580 clashes with subversives, of whom we killed 914 and wounded 702. We captured 517 rebels, and 54 persons who were with the subversive groups have surrendered to the authorities.

We seized 1,027 weapons of various calibers. [end recording]

Honduras

Foreign Ministry Statement on ICJ Ruling

PA2012134488 Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio Video in Spanish 1233 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Foreign Ministry statement issued in Tegucigalpa on 20 December—read by Foreign Ministry spokesman Eugenio Castro]

[Text] Statement issued by the Honduran Foreign Ministry secretary:

Today, 20 December 1988, the ruling of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] was released. The ICJ declared itself a competent court to judge on the suit brought by Nicaragua against Honduras: Border and Across-Border Armed Actions.

2. [No number one as heard] The Honduran Government received the ruling with surprise, because it is fully convinced it had proved that the ICJ does not have legal jurisdiction in this case. The arguments presented by Honduras were clear and unquestionable although the ICJ has decided to ignore them.

Honduras based its case on the reserves added to its statement issued in 1960, by which it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in accordance with Article No 36.2 of its statutes. Both the ICJ and Nicaragua knew those reserves 2 months before Nicaragua began its actions.

Honduras also said the suit violated the Bogota pact because it promoted a legal process without exhausting all the methods presented by the Contadora Group and Esquipulas II.

3. In view of the serious political implications of the ruling, which has damaged the faith the Honduran people had in the authority that should characterize all institutions in charge of applying international law, the Honduran Government will carefully assess its situation and future actions concerning both the ICJ and Esquipulas II.

4. The Honduran Government will release the full file of the Honduran argument, the Nicaraguan counterargument, and the oral statements the two countries presented so that Honduras and the entire world will become aware of the legal soundness of our country's arguments. Hondurans can be proud of the technical quality of its legal argument concerning this essentially political case.

5. The Honduran foreign minister urgently called the Honduran representatives at The Hague, including Ambassador Mario Carias Zapata, for consultations about the surprising ruling.

Issued by the Honduran Foreign Ministry secretary.

Spokesman Comments on Decision

PA2012164088 Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio Video in Spanish 1200 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Telephone interview with Foreign Ministry spokesman Eugenio Castro by Guillermo Wong Arevalo; place not given—live]

[Text] [Wong] Could you tell us more about the reevaluation to be conducted by the Honduran Government after the International Court of Justice [ICJ] has declared itself competent to hear the case?

[Castro] I cannot elaborate on this subject at this moment. Naturally, the foreign minister will have to discuss the matter with the president of the Republic, who directs our foreign policy. He then will state the Honduran Government's position regarding this case. Today at about 1130 the foreign minister will hold a brief news conference during which he will answer questions. I am unable to comment any further on the subject at this time, because it is a very delicate matter that must be handled directly by the foreign minister.

[Wong] Yes, we clearly undertand your position as Foreign Ministry spokesman. However, why are the Honduran authorities so concerned when Honduras has not been punished and no final decision has been made?

[Castro] Obviously it is not a punishment; however, it means we will have to go to the ICJ to fight this case, which will require funds badly needed in our country. We also will have to use human resources from the Foreign Ministry and hire additional personnel to handle this case. We are concerned because although Honduras presented a legally strong case, the ICJ unfortunately has decided to ignore our arguments, which we considered irrefutable.

I would also like to recall that when the five Central American presidents signed the Esquipulas II agreement, an addendum signed by President Azcona and Nicaraguan President Ortega was included, freezing the hearings. This document favored a possible withdrawal of charges by Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the Sandinist government decided to go on with the suit.

I must also say this case is against Latin American international public law, as lawyer Lopez said when he referred to the Bogota accord. This document states in Article 4 that a state should not resort to a document- ...[corrects himself] to a procedure for peaceful solutions to controversies before exhausting previous procedures. By this I mean we have the Contadora Group and Esquipulas II, which are procedures for peaceful solutions to Central American problems. By going to the ICJ, Nicaragua is violating Article 4 of the Bogota accord.

Furthermore, as I said before, the two presidents signed a document with the Esquipulas II agreement. In other words, all of this is unnecessary, because any controversy or difference among Central American countries can be handled through the Contadora Group—which is still there, no one has closed it—or by Esquipulas II. Those are international instruments accepted by the five Central American countries to promote peace and development in the area, which can be used to hold talks among us to solve our problems without having to go to the ICJ.

[Wong] We realize the expenses our country will have and the need for human resources. However, we recall that Honduras recently presented to the United Nations a request to create an international peacekeeping force. Undoubtedly, this was an excellent move by Honduras before the world. Would it not be better to let reason and justice prevail based on the evidence and arguments presented to this high court to know who is right in this case?

[Castro] With all the repect I have for the ICJ, I reiterate that this was unnecessary because we have our own mechanisms. In fact, what you have just mentioned regarding the international peacekeeping force is further proof that Honduras wants peace in Central America and a solution to the problems affecting the area. I believe there is enough evidence showing that Honduras is interested in finding solutions to Central America's problems and putting an end to the problem of transgressions by armed groups at the border areas. Therefore, there was no need for Nicaragua to go to the ICJ, because we have the mechanisms—dialogue among Central American foreign ministers and presidents—to solve the problem in a cordial way without having to go to a lengthy process that can take years, a costly process at the ICJ. I cannot comment any further because, as I said, before making any decision the Honduran Government will consult Mario Carias Zapata [Honduran representative at the ICJ], who will be returning to Honduras in the next few hours. Naturally, the foreign minister will also discuss the problem with President Azcona, and then they will announce the Honduran Government's position. I repeat, going to the ICJ was uncalled for and totally unnecessary.

Lopez Contreras Cited

PA2112023688 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1843 GMT 20 Dec 88

[News conference by Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras with unidentified reporters at Foreign Ministry in Tegucigalpa—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Reporter] Honduras has made its participation in the peace process conditional on Nicaragua's withdrawal of its suit against Homduras [at the International Court of Justice, ICJ]. Will Honduras continue in the Esquipulas II peace process now that Nicaragua has reactivated the suit?

[Lopez] When Esquipulas II was signed, the suit was frozen. It should have been withdrawn immediately after Esquipulas was signed or shortly thereafter. After the April incidents, after the June 1987 [as heard] meeting in Tegucigalpa, we were going to meet in Tegucigalpa to request the establishment of a verification and control commission. Nicaragua was coming to comply with the commitment established in the April meeting in Guatemala with regard to the withdrawal of the suit. The Honduran Foreign Ministry prepared the two draft resolutions. Nicaragua's foreign minister came here only willing to sign the establishment of the verification and control commission. He refused to sign the other resolution. You must remember the not-very-moderate attitude of its foreign minister, which led to the failure of the meeting. No understanding or dialogue was possible so I

described the meeting as a failure. All of the foreign ministers returned to their countries. From that moment on, Honduras' position was that it made no sense to have a meeting of the executive commission [of the Esquipulas agreements] if there was no willingness to fulfill its commitments.

Nevertheless, we did not become an obstacle to talks. Throughout this year we have held informal meetings with foreign ministers to see if one or several agreements were possible. Since the foreign ministers comprise the executive commission, we have convened as an executive commission and have issued resolutions. This is what we did at the United Nations General Assembly and in San Salvador during the OAS General Assembly meeting. This is also what we did in Mexico as a result of informal preparations. In Mexico we issued resolutions asking the UN secretary general to help us establish a verification mechanism that will prevent the misuse of the Honduran border area. As a country in the middle we have two land borders.

[Gustavo Palencia of TIEMPO] Nicaragua's suit against Honduras [words indistinct] in the international legal process, in other words to resolve differences between states. [Words indistinct] why do you think there is a contradiction between that legal international process and the Esquipulas II political process? Are you saying that the ICJ decision to hear this case harms the Central American peace process?

[Lopez] The Honduran position is not (?new). We did not invent it. It is based on law. It is based on one of the fundamental legal instruments of the inter-American legal system. I am referring to the inter-American treaty on peaceful solutions, or the Bogota pact. One of the provisions of this treaty is that once a process for a peaceful solution has begun, another process cannot be initiated until the previous one has concluded. That provision is valid for both Honduras and Nicaragua because they are both signatories to the Bogota pact. Therefore, it would be wrong and dishonest to allow a country to resort at will to countless forums so as not to reach any agreement. For example, it could go to the OAS, the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council to raise the issues we are negotiating in Contadora and Esquipulas. On the one hand it goes to the ICJ; on the other hand, it signs an agreement to solve the issues of the Central American crisis among the Central Americans.

Therefore, there is what we call an express contradiction as well as a procedural contradiction because of the provisions of the Bogota pact, which is the instrument that Nicaragua uses as a source of jurisdiction before the ICJ. The ICJ has based its jurisdiction on Article 31 of the Bogota pact and not Article 36, Point 2, of its statute. This clearly means that from what I have seen of the court decision with regard to Contadora, which was the process that was underway when the suit was filed, the court decision is equivalent to Contadora's death certificate. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] There are reports on statements by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega that you should hear so you can reply on the basis of those remarks. [passage omitted with reporter reading news report on Ortega's remarks on ICJ decision] Can you comment on these statements?

[Lopez] [Passage omitted] I will respond on the assumption that the report is accurate. I think it is an emotional reaction, because no one here in the ministry or any Honduran Government spokesperson has said Honduras does not recognize the court decision. It is one thing to disagree with it and another to reject it. Therefore, this reaction makes no sense.

What is attributed to Mr Ortega is very dangerous, however. I am talking about the attempt to reexamine or to question a judicial ruling on territorial boundaries that was issued 28 years and that was just a confirmation, because the dispute had been resolved in 1906—in other words, almost a century ago. Therefore, the reaction does not make much sense to me. It could just be an emotional outburst or a mistake in the news report. I hope it is the latter. I say this because if each president or each government in a moment of great emotion decides to revise international treaties on borders, it would cause an international chaos that would be difficult to handle.

[Reporter] The last part of Point 3 of the Foreign Ministry statement on the latest events states: The Honduran Government will carefully assess its situation and future actions concerning both the ICJ and Esquipulas II. Does this mean Honduras will ignore the ICJ decisions in both the Nicaraguan suit, regardless of the ruling, and the case of the border problem with El Salvador? In the same way, will we ignore any decision made within the framework of Esquipulas II?

[Lopez] The paragraph you just read means exactly what it states; nothing more, nothing less. If I had wanted to state that we are going to ignore the ICJ decisions, I would have clearly and without any doubt said so. That is not the case. We are capable of stating what we mean. What is stated there is the following: that we have to examine Honduras' position in relation to the court. The court is an institution. We are not referring to the result of the proceedings. We are talking about the court and the political process underway. This is something that is not only done when one receives an adverse ruling. It is a normal process carried out by responsible governments that must reassess situations so that their positions will be in line with the political circumstances. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] was said that if the ICJ stated it would hear this case, Honduras would surely withdraw from the Esquipulas II peace process. Will Honduras withdraw or will it remain in the Esquipulas II peace process?

[Lopez] I think that if you quote me correctly and faithfully, you will see that what I said was that if the court states it has jurisdiction, this could have very harmful effects on the Esquipulas II political process. This does not necessarily mean that those effects are the result of actions by Honduras. I objectively stated this, and you can [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Guerrilla Communique on Peace Corps Attack
PA2112040888 San Pedro Sula TIEMPO in Spanish 20 Dec 88 p 9

[Communique issued by the "7 April Martyrs Command" of the Morazanist Patriotic Front in Honduras in "December 1988"]

[Text] Honduran people:

The so-called Peace Corps is a front of the U.S. CIA and the State Department, which, within the strategy of an all-out war against the Central American peoples, carry out intelligence and psychological warfare tasks against our peoples.

Today, the Peace Corps' headquarters has been the target of an attack by the Morazanist Patriotic Front [Frente Patriotico Morazanista, FPM] urban commando units; of the patriots who, struggling against the Yankee occupiers, fight for Honduras' independence and sovereignty.

In the past our hero and leader, General Francisco Morazan, fought the imperialist invader. The FPM picks up the legacy he left to the youth of our fatherland.

"Death to the Yankee Invader"

"7 April Martyrs" Command

FPM

Honduras, December 1988

Government Arranges Release of Contras' POW's
PA2012235288 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1928 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Government communique issued on 20 December; read by Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras at the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Room in Tegucigalpa—live]

[Text] The Honduran Government recently learned that armed groups of the Nicaraguan Resistance are holding a sizable number of former Sandinist soldiers and Nicaraguan civilians in Honduran territory; specifically, in the area around Yamales.

The existence of these prisoner-of-war camps set up by the Nicaraguan Resistance in Honduran territory, in addition to violating our laws and constituting a violation of our sovereignty, is an offense to our country's dignity, which cannot be tolerated.

In light of this situation, the executive branch began a series of efforts through the proper authorities to release the detained persons and to place them under the protective custody of the Catholic Church, the Honduran Red Cross, and the Inter-Institutional Commission on Human Rights.

To this end a meeting was held today at the Foreign Ministry with representatives from the institutions mentioned above, all of whom voiced not only their acceptance of the assignment given them by the Honduran Government but also their pleasure and solidarity with the government measures. They described these measures both as humanitarian and as strengthening national dignity and sovereignty.

The release of 104 people has been scheduled for today. However, the government is aware that many more people are still being detained and will pursue all efforts until all detainees are released.

Nicaragua

Ortega Addresses Unions, Views ICJ Ruling
PA2012201688 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1707 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Speech by President Daniel Ortega Saavedra at a meeting of the Permanent Congress for Latin American Workers Trade Union Unity (CPUSTAL) at the Olof Palme Convention Center in Managua—live]

[Text] First, I must express my gratitude on behalf of Nicaraguan workers, peasants, technicians, professionals, teachers, of all the main forces in our country, in our homeland; on behalf of our EPS soldiers; and on behalf of our comrades in the Interior Ministry for the recognition CPUSTAL has expressed through Comrade Roberto Prieto. We value this and view it as recognition by CPUSTAL of the Nicaraguan workers who have been defending with their blood, efforts, sacrifice, awareness, and ideology this piece of liberated land on the American Continent that U.S. imperialism has again tried to occupy.

To our Latin American and Caribbean brotherly workers, to the brotherly workers in developed countries who have placed their confidence in the Nicaraguan workers, we can say we will not yield, that this revolution is invincible because it is supported by the awareness, strength, and ideology of workers and peasants. [applause]

As a second point, I will mention the recognition made this morning of our comrade brigadists, our comrade workers, who represent the thousands of brother workers who have given their lives, effort, and dedication in defending the revolution. This shows once again where the strength of our revolution lies. Our revolution's strength cannot be measured in terms of weapons or by the amount of money the country may have in reserves. Our revolution's strength is measured by the inner reserves within the Nicaraguan people, workers, peasants, and workers. Therefore, our country's most valuable asset lies in the awareness, in the ideology of Nicaraguan workers determined to defend this revolutionary process. It is there where we find the historical heritage that has always rebeled against oppression, imperialist occupation, and the various forms of capitalist exploitation. It is also through those values we have been able to defeat U.S. attacks, that we have been able to continue defeating the mercenary forces and face the various economic challenges imposed on us by the enemy. We are facing a very powerful enemy, the United States, which has caused great damage to our economy.

The economic problems are big. This is already known. We are not going to solve them overnight. However, the workers have a great attitude. They want to face and solve these problems.

We are working and will continue to work in that direction. We are also certain that the workers' awareness goes beyond the limitations, difficulties, and problems that we have to face every day.

Our revolutionary project, as we have reiterated, is a project with a socialist orientation. However, socialism does not appear by decree. Socialism has to be developed. It is developed by shifting productive forces and it is also developed, basically, by creating awareness.

With the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution on 19 July 1979, the Nicaraguans, with the FSLN at the vanguard, laid the groundwork for building a socialist Nicaragua. But it will be a socialist Nicaragua that is dependent on our degree of awareness and our ideological strength in the country's different economic and social sectors.

It is a socialism that must be refined with the structural changes in the economic sector that the Sandinist revolution has been proposing since 19 July 1979.

This is a challenge. It is a challenge for the men and women who are part of the FSLN vanguard. It is a challenge for the mass and social organizations, which explain their ideas through their example and action in our country's different social and economic sectors.

Therefore, the big challenge is to increase the awareness of Nicaraguan men and women about true positions of justice, freedom, and democracy. This must be done fighting the backwardness bequeathed by imperialism and capitalism and fighting the disinformation campaigns and the ideological and propaganda struggle that imperialism and capitalism are carrying out every day through other means here in our country.

In this way we will be in better shape to form a socialist society following the consolidation of the people's awareness and the development of our own material struggles. Nicaraguan workers and the FSLN fought for a socialist society in Nicaragua. Conscientious men will continue to fight for a socialist society, ready to free themselves from the various forms of exploitation and oppression threatening our people. [applause]

As the third point, I refer to the situation we are in on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the revolutionary triumph. We cannot forget it, and therefore we cannot but explain this to the different sectors, to each and every one of us. Although we tried in the early years to rebuild the country, this not has been possible because of the aggression and war waged against us by the United States. Therefore, the Nicaraguan revolution's agenda does not include economic or social development. The daily agenda of the Nicaraguan revolution has the defense of revolutionary power as its principal objective, which we have pursued during these years of so many sacrifices, so many economic problems, and so much sorrow among the Nicaraguan people.

We can be satisfied that we are achieving this objective. For almost 8 years we have faced the Reagan administration, which is intent on destroying our revolutionary power. This has meant that we have had to bypass other tasks in the economic and social areas. We have addressed other tasks one way or another. We have done so in spite of severe restrictions. Our main objective continues to be defending the revolution. As long as relations with the United States are not normalized, as long as peace is not achieved, we cannot say the war is over. Therefore, working for the defense of our country is a task we all should assume. We must recognize this morning the role of the various mass organizations, particularly the Sandinist Central Organization of Workers, the Association of Farm Workers, and all other labor and social organizations in carrying out the military defense of the revolution. This task continues to be the order of the day, because the threat of direct intervention by the United States has not disappeared. The danger of an escalation of the border war provoked by the United States, using Honduras as an instrument, has not disappeared. The activity of the mercenary bands has not disappeared. Only yesterday or the day before the mercenaries killed an 8-year-old girl near the San Juan River.

We must continue to attend to the economic problems, not with IMF measures to sacrifice the workers but with measures in keeping with our situation that distribute the crisis among all the economic and social sectors of our country. We will be addressing this topic intensely every day and will continue to do so, both at the National Planning Council and at the FSLN Directorate,

to draft an economic policy for next year. It will be a continuation of the economic policy that we have applied since February that will allow us to maintain a survival economy on a more rational basis, to increase the current capacity of our enterprises in the city and countryside, and, above all, to increase the awareness of the workers.

When this document is ready, we will begin a process with the country's sectors, particularly with you, the workers. This process will allow people to discuss and familiarize themselves with the document. I was telling [name indistinct] that we expected to begin this process of discussions in the first half of January.

The situation is very tense. That is true. But now, after the measures we took in February and June, we have better means of taking the actions demanded by the economic situation.

Inflation has been high. This inflation should not surprise us, however. We took measures to set the right price for many things, such as supplies, spare parts, and everything we import. This resulted in higher prices for those products, which led to inflation.

You should not be surprised by the inflation rate at the end of this year, although we should note that these measures were not implemented until February. According to our estimates, the annual inflation rate is 10,000 percent.

That is very high. However, it is a high figure because it is caused by the increase in prices of certain products decreed by the February and June economic measures. These prices were so low that these products were being smuggled to other Central American countries. The higher prices of those products are a very important part of the higher inflation rate.

We have a very rigid defense budget. Certain adjustments were made, however, and we recommended changes in the defense budget for next year. But we have a rigid defense budget.

We also have social expenses. We have educational and health expenses. They are necessary expenditures, because we are not willing to close down schools and health centers. We could do it, but through the INSSBI [Nicaraguan Social Security and Welfare Institute] we have to provide services for the people—children, adults, and workers. We might make certain adjustments in these institutions, but at a higher level.

These adjustments will be made at the INSSBI's higher levels without closing a single [words indistinct]. Adjustments will be made at the Health Ministry's higher level without closing a single hospital. Adjustments will be made at the Education Ministry's and other higher education organizations' higher level without closing a single school. [30-second interruption by station announcer] ...in spending. As you know, we have had problems with the prices set by some enterprises. We must make sure products are not overpriced. If they are, the people will not buy them.

Workers themselves must make sure the prices of products correspond to the real value of those products.

Another problem we must face is the surplus of workers in certain enterprises. There are still enterprises that have too many workers. The comrades do not meet with the workers. If comrades want to maintain the number of workers in those enterprises, we must commit ourselves to and meet production goals to guarantee the output. However, we must also commit ourselves to certain wage norms that correspond to the enterprises' capacity. We cannot ask an enterprise to pay wages that are above its [word indistint] profitability. [Words indistinct] profitability, because sometimes [words indistinct] have no profitability and practically survive on subsidies.

Our work must be predominantly political and ideological. It demands strict discipline and more and better organization. That is what I can tell you about our economic plans and budget for 1989, which we are already discussing.

I cannot speak of [passage indistinct] a magic formula that will solve Nicaragua's economic problems instantly. No one has that formula.

Everybody has suddenly become an economic expert here. The rightist experts and other independent experts specialize in [word indistinct] the Nicaraguan crisis. Any of you, however, could explain the Nicaraguan crisis with more precision, certainty, and authority. You could explain it better than any of those rightist or independent experts and analysts. They now claim to have discovered sugar water. [Words indistinct] sugar water. Workers discovered sugar water a long time ago, because they are the ones actually experiencing the crisis and not those who come here and up theories about the crisis. [applause]

Let them come and provide a solution. Let them give me a solution to our economic problems since they are experts in solving the crisis. They cannot give us that solution. The only ones who can and will give us that solution are the the Nicaraguan workers, you comrades of the Sandinist Workers Central and of the peasant labor organizations, [applause] and the various peoples' and social organizations that are defending revolutionary power. You know the depth of the crisis and how to face it. No one can fool you about that.

As a fourth point, I wish to comment on news we learned about at dawn today, between 0300 and 0400 Nicaraguan time—that is, between 1000 and 1100 European time in The Netherlands, where the International Court of Justice [ICJ] announced the following ruling, of which I will read a summary because the ruling is lengthy:

The core of the ruling, which I will comment on, reads as follows: For those reasons, the court: First, unanimously believes it has jurisdiction, based on Article 31 of the Bogota pact, to review a suit introduced by the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua on 28 July 1986; second, the court unanimously believes Nicaragua's suit is admissible.

What is the court referring to? What Nicaraguan suit is it referring to? Nicaragua had filed a suit before that court, suing Honduras to have that court review the participation and complicity of the Honduran Government in armed activities, meddling in internal affairs, and violation of Nicaraguan sovereignty.

Honduras has claimed that this court has no juridical base to accept this Nicaraguan suit. The court today said yes; it said it does have jurisdiction, and it said so unanimously. Furthermore, the U.S. judge (Sovel) voted to give course to this suit.

Why? This judge would be facing a credibility problem if he had voted no. He would have buried himself as a jurist and expert. Under such circumstances, he could not place politics before his future as a jurist; he would have made a fool out of himself when everyone was voting in favor of it.

Thus the U.S. judge, who represents the government that imposed that policy on the Honduran Government, which accepted that policy, also voted yes. The vote was 15-0; that is, 15 yes votes. It was a knockout, a goal. [applause]

What was the Honduran Government's first reaction? We are receiving a statement from the Honduran Government that reads: Today, the ICJ disclosed its decision concerning its jurisdiction. Honduras is surprised by that ruling because its arguments were clear and unobjectionable; that is, Honduras' arguments were clear and unobjectionable—the statement reads. Because of the serious political implications of the ruling, which has damaged the faith the Honduran people had in the ICJ, the Honduran Government will carefully reassess its situation and future actions concerning both the ICJ and Esquipulas II.

Honduras' reaction is interesting. If Honduras is now going to question the ICJ's role, it should be prepared to ignore all of the court's rulings concerning Honduras. If so, we would not have bothered them with this suit. If Honduras is going to ignore all ICJ rulings—including a 1960 ICJ ruling during Somoza's times, by the same court the Honduran Government is now questioning, on a territorial dispute with Nicaragua, which resulted in Nicaragua's losing 19,000 square km of mainland and over 30,000 square km of continental platform and jurisdictional waters—that would be fine with us, because we would then discuss who owns those territories. [applause] We have our views on that suit. We feel Somoza brought that suit to the ICJ because he was trying to protect himself from the armed movements that were being organized at that time from Honduras. He brought that suit to the ICJ, but he did very little to defend Nicaragua's rights over that territory. On 19 July 1979, we did not question the ICJ's ruling. We could have very well questioned the ruling, appealed to the ICJ, and found ways to reopen the case. However, we did not. We have always been respectful of the court's ruling and international law. We support international law.

Now, this is what Honduras has to say in its statement. We hope Honduras does not do the things this document says. Honduras is threatening to undo the entire Esquipulas II peace plan. I repeat: Honduras would be ignoring the court. Nicaragua's suit is not the only one. In May 1976, Honduras and El Salvador mutually agreed to appeal to the ICJ to settle territorial disputes over land, sea, and island areas. This is a long-standing problem between them [3-second break in reception].

Nicaragua has been defending international law. Nicaragua feels the developing countries—and all the countries of the world—have this instrument to defend ourselves. All the UN member countries must use the ICJ as an instrument to settle their disputes without having to resort to violence or the use of force. In 1984 Nicaragua brought a suit against the United States. In a historic ruling on 27 June, the ICJ [words indistinct] the United States. Later, we brought the suit against Honduras. Now we have this ICJ decision, which strengthens international law. The decision strengthens the UN instruments at a time when it is being strengthened by the USSR, which has asked for UN participation in Afghanistan's case; by Cuba, which has (?sought) UN participation in the troop withdrawal from Angola; and by the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.

The United Nations has also taken part in the recognition of the PLO, [words indistinct] of the United Nations. [Words indistinct] strengthening of international legal order. Obviously, the ICJ ruling tends to strengthen international legal order as well. In view of the statement issued by the Honduran Government, we hope it will act with due caution, because if Honduras now questions the ICJ ruling and its legitimacy, Honduras would be giving all rights to Nicaragua to resort to the ICJ and reopen the case of the territory in dispute. That would be the logical action to take if Honduras acts according to its statement.

It is not right to resort to a judge, expecting the judge will rule in favor of [words indistinct] the judge can also rule against the person resorting to it. [Words indistinct] if tomorrow that judge rules against me, why should I be upset? That is what is happening with Honduras now. When the ICJ ruled in favor of Honduras in the case of the territory in dispute, the ICJ was very good. Now that the ICJ has ruled...[changes thought] in this case in which everybody clearly knows that Honduras has let the mercenaries use its terrritory as a base to attack Nicaragua, to open the case, to open the trial—then they say the

ICJ [passage indistinct] the ICJ cannot deal with that issue. The ICJ, however, says it can deal with that. It says it knows about the problem.

When the ICJ ruling [words indistinct] the reaction is now to threaten the ICJ and the Esquipulas peace plan. That attitude surprises me, because I recently met with President Azcona in Mexico and he asserted before the other Central American presidents that Honduras would not mix the ICJ issue with the Esquipulas agreement and with the meetings of Central American foreign ministers and presidents.

We hope the Honduran president will keep his word. We hope the Honduran Government abides by the ICJ ruling. If the Honduran Government does not do that, Honduras will be showing total inconsistency. Honduras resorts to the ICJ and abides by the ICJ ruling when the ICJ rules in favor of Honduras, as in the case of the territory in dispute in 1960. Honduras agrees to resort to the ICJ in the case of a historical problem it has with El Salvador concerning the dispute of a piece of land and the use of territorial waters, etc. Meanwhile, in the case of Nicaragua, Honduras now refuses to abide by the ICJ ruling. That goes against all logic, it weakens Honduras, and it stains Honduras' seriousness.

We trust the Honduran Government is acting seriously and that it will act responsibly, because the Honduran people deserve our respect and because we have no disagreements with the Honduran people. We have no problems with Honduran workers. On the contrary, most Hondurans have expressed solidarity toward Nicaragua.

We have discussed these four points this morning, brother workers, brother Nicaraguans. We are also facing a new battle of the coffee harvest. Thousands of workers from diverse state agencies, from productive centers, and thousands of students are already mobilized for it. Hundreds of brothers from other countries have also joined the battle for the coffee harvest. They come from far away, respectful of our people, to participate in the coffee harvest. Our brothers come from Latin America, the United States, Canada, the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries, from England, Spain, France, Italy, and many Nordic countries. They come here from countries where coffee is not harvested to learn how to pick coffee. Our brothers come from other countries and continents. Our brothers come from all over the world to be in solidarity with the Sandinist revolution. We believe we will win the new battle of the coffee harvest, based on our efforts and thanks to international solidarity.

We are facing many problems. We have many jobs to do. However, above our many problems we have the people's capabilities. We have the people's creativity and the workers' awareness. We are convinced we will win the battle of the coffee harvest. We are going to go on defeating the mercenary forces. We are going to continue facing the diverse economic, social, and political problems. We are going to continue consolidating our revolutionary process. Free fatherland! [Crowd shouts: Or death!]

Tunnermann Analyzes Status of Opposition

PA2112004988 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1930 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Interview with Dr Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim, Ambassador to the OAS, by unidentified reporter; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Tunnermann] First, [words indistinct] is an indication of the divisions and factions within the Nicaraguan political opposition. Unity is the last thing one can talk about given the number of political groups that took part in the meeting, each with a different set of proposals.

Second, regarding amendments to the Nicaraguan Constitution and to recently enacted constitutional laws, I think that the opposition parties represented in the legislature had an opportunity to take part in the debates on these laws—namely, those that deal with constitutional matters, such as the Amparo law, the law on emergencies, and the electoral law. The problem is that, very often, the representatives of the opposition parties only attend the general debates on a given subject. With few exceptions, these representatives are absent from the legislative debates, or they withdraw from the legislative chamber and thus do not take part in the debates. They could contribute to the improvement of those laws, as has been the case with the legislators who attend the debates. At times, these legislators have made proposals that have been [words indistinct], even by FSLN legislators. It would seem, then, that the opposition legislators have wasted the opportunity to participate in the important debates that take place at the National Assembly.

Regarding amendments to the Constitution, the appropriate forum for the discussion of these amendments is the Constituent Assembly, formed from within the National Assembly, and not a parallel forum, as has been called for by the opposition parties' legislative representatives. In addition, we are dealing with a recently enacted Constitution; barely a few months have passed, and already there are calls for amendments to the Constitution.

[Reporter] Doctor, do you believe that the so-called internal opposition in Nicaragua will change its attitude toward the FSLN next year?

[Tunnermann] It seems to me—and the opposition should also admit it—that we have taken steps to institutionalize the political process. The government has based itself on laws that develop the basic principles [word indistinct] of the Constitution such as political pluralism, mixed economy, and nonalignment. Those

principles give ample political opportunities to the opposition. Therefore, if the opposition uses those opportunities with intelligence, it would truly contribute to solving problems and to concentrating our people's energy into the country's recovery and the development of socioeconomic programs. That would be a much more positive attitude than the one the opposition is taking. The opposition is taking a purely negative position.

We can see that attitude at the assembly. Some of them only come at the beginning of a session and then [words indistinct] they vote against everything. That is not an intelligent attitude, because they simply oppose everything instead of contributing with their studies and intelligence to improving the country's laws.

[Reporter] Dr Tunnermann, the opposition insists on demanding amendments to 17 provisions of the Constitution. Do you think the opposition has made any progress in its position?

[Tunnermann] The opposition maintains the same positions it has been maintaining for over 1 year. In that sense, they have not made any progress. Unfortunately, we cannot say the opposition really wants to seek ways to overcome disagreements and to consolidate peace in 1989 through a serious, constructive dialogue. We hope for peace, which will let us work jointly—while respecting each other's views and ideologies—and with a single desire, which is to move our country forward.

[Reporter] Do you think the current opposition represents a threat to the FSLN?

[Tunnermann] It does not represent any threat to the FSLN, and the opposition knows that well, because it is an extremely fragmented opposition. There is almost no opposition party that does not have one, two, or three factions. Furthermore, sometimes there are various ideological trends within those factions.

The opposition is extremely divided, and it is not an alternative to the FSLN at all.

[Reporter] Does the FSLN plan to present any laws during the next legislative period?

[Tunnermann] The government has announced a series of bills, including one that was announced during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Human Rights Charter. The government announced the need to draft a new criminal code. Everybody feels the need for a more modern criminal code, because the current one cannot really solve the problems our country is facing.

In addition, there are laws that must give [words indistinct] municipalities. In other words, we need laws to verify the boundaries of municipal voting districts to then [words indistinct] commissions for municipal elections, which will be held, after all these processes are completed, at the same time as the general elections in 1990.

In any case, there are still a few things we must work on regarding the law regulating municipalities, because it deals with electoral matters.

Panama

Noriega Professes Solidarity With Argentina

PA2112014388 Panama City Telemetro Television in Spanish 2315 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the Panama Defense Forces, has once again reiterated that he neither meddles in Argentine domestic matters nor wishes to hinder Argentina's destiny as an independent nation. Gen Noriega made these statements at a ceremony honoring six military attaches, including two Argentine officers, who have completed their missions in Panama. Gen Noriega and his General Staff honored the military attaches with the Distinguished Service Decoration.

The Distinguished Service Decoration, First Class, was awarded to Argentine Commodore (Jose Carrazedo), Argentine Colonel (Claris Dilgil), and Peruvian Navy Captain Edmundo Davila Vargas. The Distinguished Service Decoration, Second Class, was awarded to Chilean Colonel Antonio Palomo Contreras, Peruvian Colonel (Eladio Arbulu Meyer), and Colombian Colonel Omar Ruiz Perdomo.

Gen Noriega stressed the importance of strengthening relations among the Armed Forces of the aforementioned countries. He said he believes technical cooperation and assistance should be expanded among sister armed forces.

[Begin Noriega recording, in progress] ...and also for Argentina. As a commander, a soldier, a man of his word, and a Panamanian, I reaffirm that we could never violate Argentina's destiny or hinder our relations. Argentina has its own problems, its own men with problems, its own destiny, and its own Armed Forces. Argentina's Armed Forces and people make their own decisions.

Juan Domingo Peron, an Argentine commander, came to this country at a time when no other country would accept him. He came here to save his life. Other Argentines have also come to this country under similar conditions. Panama offered its active solidarity to Argentina at a time when that country was experiencing a geopolitical problem. Panama's geopolitical problem was compared to Argentina's geopolitical problem. Colonel Bianchi, today General Bianchi, is witness to this. He knows that when a Panamanian gives his word, he does not go back on it. [end recording]

APEDE, Civic Crusade Leader Arrested

PA2112034088 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0229 GMT 21 Dec 88

[Text] Panama City, 20 Dec (ACAN-EFE)—Ricardo Brenes, opposition leader and president of the Panamanian Association of Business Executives (APEDE), was arrested at his home today by state security agents, a relative reported today.

The source, a brother-in-law of the leader, said that Brenes' house was raided and a hunting shotgun seized.

A public relations source of the Panamanian Defense Forces, FDP, whose agents carried out the raid, according to Brenes' brother-in-law, told ACAN-EFE that "it has no knowledge of anything."

Brenes' relative explained that so far the reason is not known for the arrest of the leader of the opposition Civic Crusade, a multiparty organization that advocates the departure of Defense Forces chief General Manuel Antonio Noriega.

He added that he does not know where Brenes is now. Last year Brenes left the country and lived for a few months in exile in the United States.

'Improper' Resolution on Davis Denied

PA2012172688 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 20 Dec 88 pp 1, D-8

[Report by Cesar E. Gomez Marin]

[Excerpt] The Legislative Assembly yesterday declared improper [improcedente] a resolution presented by Honorable Legislator Rigoberto Paredes by which the Legislative Assembly would "recommend" that the executive branch ask U.S. Ambassador Arthur Davis to immediately leave Panama for having "violated public and international law" and ethical and decency norms that diplomats must follow in their relationship with the people and government of the country to which they are accredited.

Based on Article 157-No 2 and Article 179-No 9 of the national Constitution, which ban meddling of a state branch in matters exclusively under the jurisdiction of another, acting Assembly President Honorable Legislator Florencio Asprilla declared the resolution improper after a bitter exchange among Paredes, Alarcon, and others. Alarcon pointed out that a similar resolution he had presented was labeled "improper" by Paredes and others of the official bloc.

"Davis should have been expelled a long time ago," Alarcon said. He added that on this occasion he would not support anyone's "demagogical patriotism."

Meanwhile, Honorable Legislator Paredes, who had requested a nominal vote, appealed the Presidency's ruling and clarified that the resolution is not improper for meddling in the jurisdiction of the executive branch as claimed, because it only recommends the expulsion of Ambassador Davis for all the things this man has done against and said about Panama and its people. "The Constitution does not ban the Assembly from making recommendations to the executive branch," Paredes added.

The plenary, however, in a very close vote, supported the Assembly president's ruling declaring this resolution improper, and Paredes was forced to withdraw his appeal and the resolution itself. [passage omitted]

Cartoon Lampoons 'Sheriff of Panama' Davis

PA2012172488 [Editorial Report] Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish on page 40 of its 20 December issue carries a 5-by-6-inch cartoon of U.S. Ambassador to Panama Arthur Davis dressed as a cowboy, wearing a "Sheriff of Panama" badge and pointing to a dwarf version of Panamanian General Manuel Antonio Noriega. The caricature of Gen Noriega is depicted as showing fear. The caricature of Ambassador Davis is telling Gen Noriega the following: "I rule over Panama. Noriega, you have to leave.... There will be no elections, and the U.S. bases will stay in Panama for free until the year 2000."

Legal Action Begins on 'Delinquent Taxpayers'

PA1712194288 Panama City CRITICA in Spanish 16 Dec 88 pp 1, 11

[Report by Mario Martinez]

[Text] Legal proceedings were initiated yesterday against several delinquent taxpayers. These taxpayers are highly paid employees of U.S. companies that operate in Panama and in the canal area, including employees of the Panama Canal Commission. The Finance and Treasury Ministry's Internal Revenue Department previously had warned that these proceedings were imminent.

Luis Mathieu, Panama Province's internal revenue administrator who has judicial authority in tax cases, told CRITICA that legal proceedings have been initiated against delinquent taxpayers.

He added that the proceedings might conclude with the confiscation of these persons' property.

"These proceedings cover all taxpayers and do not exclude U.S. companies or Panama Canal Commission employees," Mathieu said.

Mathieu noted that in the first phase, actions will be taken against the highest-paid delinquent taxpayers; Panamanian workers at the lower-income levels will not be affected.

The Panama Province internal revenue administrator said all legal requirements will be followed in these proceedings against delinquent taxpayers.

Among the names in the initial summonses, which were published in local newspapers today, is Fernando Manfredo, Panama Canal Commission deputy administrator.

Mathieu emphasized that these measures are being taken against delinquent taxpayers—both private individuals and companies—regardless of their nationality.

The first individuals summoned are: Enrique Marquez, Abdiel Aizpurua, Edilberto Lopez, Juan Saravanja, Carlos Linares, Herminio del Rosario, Neuman Vasquez, Guillermo Mercier, Cesar F. Quintero, Adriano Diaz, Jose Melgar, Erasmo Estrella, Alonso Pitti, Fernando Manfredo, Guillermo Van Hoorde, Carlos Alvarado, Ricardo Varela, Pablo Palacios, and Daisy Anguizola.

[Panama City MATUTINO in Spanish on 16 December on pages 11 and 12 publishes summonses for the aforementioned 19 persons to appear within 10 days before the Internal Revenue Department. The persons summoned are employees of Eastern Airlines, Texaco, IBM, and the Panama Canal Commission. The paper also publishes another identical summons against Lawrence Hurley, identified as an Eastern Airlines employee.]

Columnist Notes Soviet Activity at Airport

PA2012140988 Panama City MATUTINO in Spanish 20 Dec 88 p 5

[From the "Confidential Report" column by Jaime E. Beitia]

[Text] Omar Torrijos Airport resembled an ants' nest weeks ago. Soviets were boarding and alighting from Soviet Aeroflot flights because of the large movement of their fishing activity in the Pacific.

Civic Crusade Member on Electoral Tribunal

PA1612222388 Panama City Telemetro Television in Spanish 2300 GMT 14 Dec 88

[Statements made by Jose Mulino, attorney-at-law and member of the National Civic Crusade, to unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Mulino] The truly democratic faction within the Authentic Panamenist Party (PPA), led by Jorge Pacifico Adames and Guillermo Endara, and the faction led by Mr Nicosia, are going to test the Panamanian Government's favorable disposition—or lack of it—toward democracy and free elections in 1989.

This powerful party, which has the support of the majority within the Panamanian opposition, is going to get the same treatment given in the past to the PALA [Labor Party], led by Carlos Eleta; the Liberal Party, led by Roderick Esquivel; the Republican Party, led by Eric Arturo Delvalle; and the Panamenist Party of 1983, led by Dr [Arnulfo] Arias, which was stolen from him by [Gaspar] "Toty" Suarez.

The treatment given to the PPA will show the entire country whether or not this regime is favorably disposed toward democracy and the holding of free and honest elections in 1989. If the party is stolen and its leaders changed through illegal acts at the Electoral Tribunal, this will provide an indication, or example, of the nature of the 1989 elections. [passage omitted, including passage by reporter]

[Mulino] As a country and as a nation Panama suffered a severe trauma in 1984. The will of the people was not respected; the will of the people was humiliated by the Electoral Tribunal, which again purports to act as arbiter in an election. Obviously, this is going to be a much more complex and difficult task to perform than in 1984.

In my opinion, the current Electoral Tribunal provides no guarantees. The Panamanian Government has lost another opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to hold free and honest elections. By maintaining the current membership of the Electoral Tribunal, the government does not show willingness to institute democracy in Panama through elections. On the contrary, it will do whatever is necessary to stay in power against the voice and will of the Panamanian people.

People's Party, PALA Discuss 'Alliance'

PA1712201488 Panama City MEDIODIA in Spanish 15 Dec 88 p 10

[Text] The People's Party Politburo yesterday visited the headquarters of the Labor Party, PALA, to discuss the creation of a new political alliance for the 1989 elections.

In a statement to the media, PALA Secretary General Ramon Sieiro said: A dialogue with the country's different political forces is part of our plan to establish a new government alliance.

Sieiro said "the People's Party shares to a great extent PALA's nationalist ideas about the 1989 elections." He said it is possible that the name of the new alliance will be chosen next week once all opinions in this regard are considered.

Sieiro said his party maintains a "progressive, centrist" ideology. "We are neither with the Left nor with the Right; we are with Panama," he said.

People's Party Secretary General Ruben Dario Sousa said "there is much agreement between the communists and PALA regarding the defense of the nation from the U.S. aggression." MEDIODIA learned that the People's Party is prepared to discuss an alliance as soon as the alliance's objectives are determined next week.

Export Industry Leader Predicts Gloomy Future
PA2012040988 Panama City MEDIODIA in Spanish 19 Dec 88 p 7

[Unattributed article]

[Text] Guillermo Fernandez, president of the Panamanian Exporters Association (APEX), has said that the 50-percent reduction in industrial activity during 1988 will have a dramatic effect in 1989 if present political conditions persist.

"Our economy has suffered the worst damage in the nation's history. The industrial export sector continues to reel under the effect of bank closures, restrictions, and the political problems, all of which have caused a lack of credibility and loss of confidence in the sector," said Fernandez.

He added that "we are nervous about what could happen after January," noting that exports have dropped 15 percent.

Fernandez conceded that there have been some positive signs in the last few months, owing to the time of year, when many try to recover what they have lost. However, this apparent improvement can not make us forget the large losses that the industry will have at the end of this year.

Fernandez said that an urgent change of government is required to allow a restructuring of the country at every level.

Argentina

Alfonsin Calls Special Congressional Meeting

PY2012183088 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1500 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpts] In a letter to Vice President Victor Martinez, who is also Senate chairman, President Raul Alfonsin has called a special congressional meeting to be held at 1000 tomorrow morning. In the meeting, Alfonsin will address the country on the military situation.

This afternoon, President Alfonsin will receive, individually, the Armed Forces chiefs. Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena will attend each of these meetings. [passage omitted]

The president's message to Congress will deal exclusively with the military rebellion that occurred in the beginning of December.

Presidential spokesman Jose Ignacio Lopes has reported on President Alfonsin's letter calling for the congressional session, authorized under the Constitution:

[Begin Lopes recording] As a result of the military crisis that occurred on 2, 3, and 4 December, and taking into consideration the superior interests of the nation, I hereby ask you to call a special Congressional session for 21 December at 1000, as authorized in Paragraph 2, Article 86 of the National Constitution.

On the occasion, I will address the representatives of the people and of the Argentine Provinces to comment on the aforementioned military crisis. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Military sources have reported to TELAM Press Agency that Army Chief of Staff General Dante Caridi has sent a cable to all units throughout the country stating that he is working on the normalization of the Army situation. [passage omitted]

Army Confirms Retirement of Chief of Staff

PY2012215888 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2136 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Buenos Aires, 20 Dec (NA)—The Army today officially confirmed the retirement of Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jose Dante Caridi and of Division Generals Miguel Abbate and Enrique Bianchi.

Rumors on Possible Successors

PY2012220488 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1500 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpts] The media have been reporting on Lieutenant General Dante Caridi's rumored retirement, which reportedly will be announced on 23 December, the anniversary of the Monte Chingolo Battle. [passage omitted]

The two officers being mentioned as Caridi's successors are IV Corps Commander Valentin Vernier and V Corps Commander Humberto Ferrucci.

If the government chooses Vernier, eight generals will have to go onto the retirement list. If Ferrucci is chosen, only four generals will have to go onto the retirement list.

Ferrucci's recent comments on an alleged agreement between Caridi and rebellious leader Colonel Seineldin, however, has created unrest in some military circles. That fact may have a bearing on the choice of Caridi's replacement. Vernier, on the other hand, is considered a serious and well-balanced man. [passage omitted]

Other sources mention II Corps Commander Isidro Caceres as another possible replacement for Caridi. Caceres' name, however, was apparently discarded because of rumors that pressure may have been exerted as a result of Seineldin's mutiny.

Generals Miguel Abbate and Alfredo Arellaga, who are Caridi's close aides, are also being mentioned as possible successors. [passage omitted]

Gassino Nominated as Chief

PY2112111488 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0050 GMT 21 Dec 88

[Text] Buenos Aires, 20 Dec (DYN)—Brigadier General Francisco Gassino, commander of Military Institutes, was today formally nominated to replace Lieutenant General Jose Dante Caridi as Army chief of staff.

Gassino's appointment as Caridi's successor will be announced tomorrow after President Raul Alfonin's speech to a joint session of Congress.

Government To Shorten Television Schedules

PY2012140888 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1042 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpts] Buenos Aires, 20 Dec (NA)—The government has decided to shorten the transmission time of television channels, to reduce the lighting along the main avenues by 50 percent, and to cut the lighting of monuments, as complementary measures to the current staggered program of electricity blackouts. These measures are being implemented to try and overcome the country's very serious energy problem. [passage omitted]

After the meeting was over it was reported that the Culture Secretariat will instruct the state-owned television stations that they must shorten their transmission times. This order takes effect as of today "if it is possible."

It was also stated that as soon as the instructions go into effect, Channels 7 and 11 will begin broadcasting at noon and closing at midnight, with the exception of Channel 13, which will continue to broadcast its program "Desayuno" from 0700 [0900 GMT] to 0900 [1100]. [passage omitted]

Bolivia

Foreign Minister To Travel to Israel, Cuba

PY2012143188 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Before his return to Bolivia, after participating in the plenipotentiary representatives conference [on drugs in Vienna], Bolivian Foreign Minister Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez will visit Tel Aviv where he will sign an agreement that will favor both Bolivia and Israel.

It has also been reported that on 31 December, 1988 Bedregal will participate in the ceremonies scheduled to mark the Cuban Revolution.

Planning Minister on Argentine Debt Rescheduling

PY2012141988 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Planning and Coordination Minister Fernando Romero has said that Argentina has decided to reschedule the debt contracted with Bolivia. He said that Argentina hopes to meet its overdue payments by March 1989.

The state dignitary, who recently returned from Argentina where he was sent by President Victor Paz Estenssoro, accomplished his main goal of talking with Argentine President Raul Alfonsin.

According to a report released by the planning minister, the Argentine Government has decided to comply with the agreements signed with Bolivia and to pay the overdue payments.

According to the report, Argentina has formally agreed with Bolivia to disburse $20 million this week, and another $15 million by the end of 1988.

The minister said that the Argentine Government hopes to pay $50 million by March 1989, thus canceling its (?overdue payments).

Planning and Coordination Minister Fernando Romero said that the overdue interests, which total about $60 million, can be negotiated with the Argentine Government against the overdue interests on the Bolivian debt contracted with Argentina, a debt of about $700 million.

As a result of this new schedule, future payments will be made regularly, thus allowing our economy to be strengthened with funds that will be used to implement different projects.

Special Antinarcotics Forces Seize Drug Centers

PY2012234688 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 6 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Cochabamba, 5 Dec (PRESENCIA)—According to an official report released by the public relations department of the Special Antinarcotics Force office in Cochabamba, Special Antinarcotics Force personnel have destroyed 54 cocaine processing centers, in which 108 maceration pits were operating.

Explosives, cocaine sulfate, "chemicals" or elements used to process cocaine, and radio equipment were seized during the dragnet operations, which were carried out from 29 November to 2 December.

According to the report, the Antinarcotics Force personnel seized 39 bundles of dynamite sticks [masas de dinamita], 100 blasting caps, 13 meters of fuse, and 49.5 kg of cocaine sulfate.

The report also states that the "chemicals" seized included 1,340 liters of sweet water, 4,800 liters of diesel fuel, 22 liters of sulfuric acid, and 17 kg of sodium bicarbonate.

According to the report, the radio equipment is made by "Yaesu," model number 7576. In addition to this equipment, the Special Antinarcotics Force personnel seized two "jungle" antennas.

The antinarcotics actions were carried out in Miraflores, San Jose, Isinuta, Isiboro, Eteramasama, Paractito, Puente, San Francisco, and Chipiriri in the Chapare region in Cochabamba Department.

Seize Cocaine, Chemicals

PY2012223388 La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 11 Dec 88 p 7

[Excerpt] Last week, Special Antinarcotic Forces seized 25.3 kg of cocaine, dismantled 10 cocaine processing laboratories, and seized a large amount of chemicals used for cocaine processing.

The Special Forces commander reported that specialized units conducted their operations in La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz Departments.

According to the report the units arrested 10 people in La Paz who were linked to a drug distribution ring. The units seized 25.3 kg of cocaine in Cochabamba.

Forces also destroyed nine cocaine factories. The drug traffickers were operating around the town of San Francisco, Paractito, Villa Verde, Eteramasama Santa Rosa, San Jose, (Samozabets), and Cochabamba.

Forces destroyed nine cocaine factories and 18 maceration pits, and they confiscated sulphuric acid, ether, carbonate, diesel fuel, ammonia, gasoline, and other products.

In Santa Cruz the units burned 78 kg of cocaine and confiscated 4,000 liters of acetone, 1,000 liters of ammonia, permanganate, ether, and 3,000 liters of acid. [passage omitted]

Brazil

Top Secret Dossier on Radical Movements Leaked

PY2012151188 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 15 Dec 88 p 5

[Text] The information that prompted President Jose Sarney to tell O ESTADO 11 days ago that Brazil is currently "leaning to the left" is based on a detailed package of top secret documents that has been circulating among certain high-ranking government sectors for the last 6 months.

The dossier reveals the growth of the radical movements in Brazil and identifies nine such groups: Struggle and Work [Luta e Trabalho], Workers Cause [Causa Operaria], Socialist Democracy [Democracia Socialista], Communist Revolutionary Movement [Movimiento Comunista Revolucionario], Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party [Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario], Communist Revolutionary Party [Partido Revolucionario Comunista], Socialist Convergence [Convergencia Socialista], 1980 National Liberation Front [Frente de Libertacao Nacional/80], and Socialist Revolutionary Vanguard [Vanguarda Revolucionaria Socialista]. These organizations are broken down into commando, action, and militant groups based in southern, southeastern, central and northeastern regions.

According to the dossier, seven of these factions were under the PT umbrella until 1986, at which time the leaders from labor unions and church organizations decided to take steps in order to formally incorporate these parties into the PT. This initiative did not prosper; the leaders of the extremist factions chose to split from the party, taking with them a sizable number of followers.

However, the document displays special concern over the 1980 National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Socialist Revolutionary Vanguard (VRS), two groups which surfaced in Sao Paulo. The FLN comprises most of the volunteers who were in Nicaragua for the past 3 years, helping the Sandinist government and learning about the doctrine of revolutionary expansion in Latin America. The VRS is more radical . It is based on the ideals of former Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh, who believed in the principles advocated by Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini.

The only point the other groups (three of which are Trotskyite and four of which are Marxist-Leninist in ideology) have in common with the two new ones is their decision to remain underground and to make the armed struggle part of their political strategy. Their approach has been proven in at least one case: in 1986 five Brazilian Communist Party militants held up a Bank of Brazil branch on the Federal University of Bahia campus.

One of the people for whom the dossier was prepared—it was prepared by 2 of the 11 agencies of the Brazilian intelligence community—was particularly impressed with two things: the person who brought him the report, who impassively waited in his office while the dossier—of which copies cannot be made—was read and, above all, by a section of the document which addressed similarities between certain cases.

It appears that the similarities indicate that the attacks perpetrated against suburban trains of the railway system, the burning of FEPASA [Sao Paulo Railroad, Inc] train, the hijacking of a VASP [Sao Paulo Airline] flight 357 from Cuiaba to Rio de Janeiro, and other minor cases hardly made public, such as the planting of homemade bombs in military recruiting offices, were planned.

According to the document, the common factor these incidents share is the fact that they always took place on Wednesday, which is when the military police and armed forces only work half a day, which makes prompt reaction in crises difficult. In the VASP case, it should be added that hijacker Raimundo Nonato Alves de Conceicao of Maranhao could not be brought to trial because he was judged to be mentally incompetent and was placed on temporary treatment.

In the case of the FEPASA train that was destroyed on the Jaragua-Perus line, it was only 3 minutes late, it was new and very rarely crowded, yet it was attacked from every side and set on fire in the only sector of the railway virtually impossible to reach by heavy vehicles. Members of the military police were forced to leave their vehicles far away and get to the train on foot, moving slowly over very rough terrain.

The nine extreme leftist groups have a total of 4,000 members or militants and, according to the intelligence agencies, they have at least one representative in the legislative branch—Deputy Jose Genoino Neto, former member of the Araguaia guerrillas, which is linked to the Revolutionary Communist Party.

Mines, Energy Minister Submits Resignation

PY2012154888 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 1500 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Mines and Energy Minister Aureliano Chaves has just resigned. His son Antonio Aureliano delivered his father's resignation letter to President Jose Sarney at Planalto Palace. The minister is now in Belo Horizonte, where he is recuperating from a foot operation.

Rezende Named Acting Minister

PY2112000788 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpt] President Jose Sarney today accepted the resignation of Mines and Energy Minister Aureliano Chaves. Agriculture Minister Iris Rezende will replace him as acting minister.

President Sarney has just designated Agriculture Minister Iris Rezende to serve as acting Mines and Energy Minister, replacing Aureliano Chaves, whose resignation is irrevocable. [passage omitted]

Chile

PCCh Congress To Limit Leader's Tenure

PY2012212288 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 13 Dec 88 p C-2

[Excerpt] The next PCCh Congress will propose that the PCCh Secretary General no longer be allowed to be reelected for more than three consecutive terms.

PCCh leader Jose Cademartori has leaked this information to a magazine. According to him, "Luis Corvalan has been the PCCh's Secretary General for 30 years, and I know he would have given up that post long ago if he could have. We will see what the new Central Committee will say at the Congress, which will make the final decision on this matter."

Cademartori said that Luis Corvalan will have the first option. [as published] [passage omitted]

PCCh Denies Charges Filed by Government

PY2112025088 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 14 Dec 88 p C-2

[Text] The proscribed PCCh yesterday asserted that it does not support the armed struggle, but rather the peoples' "right to rebel," and that the charges filed against it by the government violate the freedom of thought.

PCCh leaders Americo Zorrilla, Jose Sanfuentes, and Guillermo Sherping, who are among the people involved in the case being heard by judge Domingo Kikisch, yesterday held a news conference to state the party's position regarding the legal actions taken against it by the government.

A declaration read by Zorrilla stated that "the PCCh categorically rejects this new act of repression by Pinochet and reasserts its decision to struggle resolutely until it gets rid of Article No 8 and the dictatorship's entire antidemocratic institutional system."

Regarding the charges of disrupting public order, inciting violence, and promoting disobedience in the Armed Forces, the PCCh holds the government responsible for such actions and maintains that the document calling their 15th Congress "is full of democratic spirit and proposes effective solutions to the serious problems afflicting the country."

The PCCh asserts that the document has been "distorted" by some sectors of the media and regrets the fact that "certain democratic sectors have based their opinion on these distorted versions."

The PCCh declaration also states: "The Communists have not appealed for armed struggle, but have rather reasserted the peoples' legitimate right to rebel against tyranny. This right is established in the UN's Universal Human Rights Declaration and is recognized by the church."

The PCCh then goes on to "charge": "In order to orchestrate this new antidemocratic offensive, the dictatorship intends to implicate the Communists in terrorist actions perpetrated by organizations linked to the government. A good example is the explosion of a bomb that wounded a 2-year-old, who is now fighting for his life. We energetically condemn this incident, which is part of a broad plan to justify repression against democrats."

Sanfuentes told the journalists that the charges filed against them represent "an attack against ideas and against all democratic forces." The PCCh spokesman ended by stating that on Monday, 12 December, he and Comrade Jose Cademartori had met with Italian Socialist Party Secretary General Bettino Craxi and that the meeting had been very positive.

Admiral Merino Denies Plebiscite To Be Held

PY2112005188 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 2200 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Admiral Jose Toribio Merino today denied reports of a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. The announcement about the plebiscite was made by Fernando Maturana, member of the political committee of the National Renewal Party, who said that the plebiscite would be held in March or April 1989.

Adm Merino, who talked with reporters at the conclusion of a legislative session in the Diego Portales building, also said that the government will not accept the six reforms to the Constitution proposed by a coalition of opposition political parties.

[Begin Merino recording] The coalition of opposition political parties are promoting amendments to the Constitution that are favorable to them and unfavorable to the government that has been running this country for the last 15 years. As long as we are in the government, we are not going to accept the proposals. [end recording]

Asked about a proposal he made for harsher laws against terrorism, Merino explained that he made that proposal because the current law is not effective. Merino added

that the government has asked its ambassadors in three countries that have antiterrorist laws to send copies of the laws so that Chile can implement similar measures.

[Begin Merino recording] [Words indistinct] we asked our embassies in three countries to send us copies of the antiterrorist laws of three European countries [passage indistinct]. [end recording]

Regarding the Episcopate's Christmas message calling for reconciliation and pacification, Adm Merino categorically said that the call is very good.

Government in 'Total Agreement' With Bishops

PY2012125988 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 0930 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Excerpts] Referring to the statement issued by the Chilean bishops, Minister Secretary of Government Miguel Angel Poduje has said that the government is in total agreement with the call made by the bishops.

[Begin Poduje recording] [passage omitted] I believe it is also necessary to emphasize the remarks by Monsignor Fresno, who yesterday rejected a document issued by the Communist Party. I believe everyone—the church and its (?pastor)—have jointly rejected the attitudes of the political sectors that advocate the people's rebellion and the struggle of classes which, as the church has clearly put it, are evils that distort and undermine western values. We are for modern culture, we defend Christian culture, and I believe that (?the remarks by Fresno) shed light on the line of thinking of the government and on its ideals of modernization. I believe that from this viewpoint we are really building our future, which we can look at with optimism. [end recording]

Minister Poduje made these remarks at the Diego Portales building after presiding over a ceremony during which the new authorities of the Women's Secretariat were installed.

Correction to Commander Reorganizes High Command

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Commander Reorganizes Navy High Command," published in the 13 December Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 36, column two:

Third paragraph, only sentence make read... Navy Captain Eduardo Oelckers Sepulveda, who will soon... (clearing name)

last paragraph, only sentence make read... Oelckers Sepulveda will be replaced by Captain Carlos Schnaidd Parker as director of... (clearing names)

Colombia

Barco on Military Presence Throughout Country

PA2012232388 Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1215 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Bogota—Colombian President Virgilio Barco has said the government will not allow left- or right-wing terrorist groups to continue their ill-fated plans to destabilize the country.

President Barco said the state and the Armed Forces will maintain their presence throughout the country, especially in the areas threatened by rebels and drug traffickers.

During a ceremony in Puerto Lopez, Barco added: Under this government, there are no areas banned to the security forces.

President Barco said the construction of the road between Mocoa and Pitalito will be completed soon. Barco said that road will restore people's faith in democracy, in the government's desire for change, and in the possibility of making progress without resorting to the devious paths of subversion, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

Peru

Argentina To Open $50-Million Credit Line

PY2012232588 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] According to a joint communique signed between Presidents Alan Garcia and Raul Alfonsin, Argentina will open a $50-million line of credit for Peru for the purchase of Argentine goods that Argentina wants to promote.

The document also deals with postponing until December 1989 the payments due on a $100-million line of credit granted to Peru for the purchase of food.

Alva Castro Elected APRA Secretary General

PY2012202588 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Early this morning Luis Alva Castro was elected APRA secretary general. The official announcement will be made in the next few hours.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified APRA member] We have just concluded the vote count, and we have the first results of the elections. The newly elected officials of the National Executive Committee and the new members of the APRA Political Committee will be officially announced later.

[Reporter] Can you give us any names?

[Answer] Yes, Luis Alva Castro was elected secretary general; (Jilme Calderon Cuenca) was elected organization secretary; Antonio Palomino was elected national secretary of discipline; Victor Lopez Garcia was elected president of the National Committee for Drawing Up a Plan of Government; Luis Alberto Sanchez was unanimously elected president of the Political Committee; and (Jorge Iriaques) was unanimously elected president of the National Committee for Property, Order, and Control.

We believe that this is a list for unity; therefore, we are willing to work for the party. [end recording]

Photographers 'Beaten' During APRA Meeting

PY2012141488 Lima Domestic Service in Spanish 1030 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Media photographers who were trying to take photographs on an APRA meeting have been beaten by a group of unidentified individuals.

OJO reporter Jose Vasques and ESPRESO reporter Ruben Aguila were taking photographs from the roof of a building next to the APRA headquarters building where they were beaten and had their film confiscated. The two were taking photographs of the 16th APRA Congress plenum.

According to the reporters a group of 10 people who refused to identify themselves, prevented them from taking photographs of the meeting and beat them.

Huancayo Prefect on Shining Path Activity

PY2112011788 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Telephone interview with Junin Department Prefect Abilio Fernandez by television anchorman Jimmy Arce—live]

[Text] [Arce] We have called Junin Prefect Abilio Fernandez in Huancayo. We will ask the prefect to comment on press reports saying that Huancayo is controlled by the Shining Path. Good afternoon, Mr Fernandez.

[Fernandez] Good afternoon.

[Arce] What can you tell us about the reports regarding the Shining Path control of Huancayo?

[Fernandez] First I must remind you that Junin Department has been under a state of emergency for about 20 days. We have heard rumors here in the last 3 or 4 days that the subversives were going to organize a strike beginning today. We do not know the extent of the strike. We tried without success to obtain leaflets regarding the strike. Huancayo is currently being patrolled by police and Army troops. The situation is completely normal with the exception of the interurban buses. Banks did not open.

[Arce] What about shops and public offices?

[Fernandez] Ninety percent of all public offices and 30 percent of all public markets have opened us usual. The interurban bus system is not operating, but city buses are working as usual. Only 10 percent of the shops opened, but the population is calm. Nothing is disturbing public order.

[Arce] Is the traffic toward Huancayo normal?

[Fernandez] The interprovincial bus system is not operating for fear of terrorist attacks.

[Arce] What about the schools?

[Fernandez] The schools are closed for vacation right now.

[Arce] We thank you, Mr Fernandez. Good afternoon.

[Fernandez] Good afternoon.

Shining Path Kills 3 Policemen in Tingo Maria

PY2112013088 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] Three policemen were killed in an ambush by the Shining Path in Tingo Maria yesterday. They will be buried at 1600 this afternoon.

The funeral will take place at the 22d Civil Guard Precinct. The three special police agents were killed while driving on the Marginal Highway yesterday. They are Sosimo Teodosio Puentes Ramirez and Modesto Teofilo Fernandez Yanez, two noncommissioned officers, and PIP [Peruvian Investigative Police] agent Jose Kiese Victoria.

The agents were ambushed by terrorists on the Marginal Highway. They were driving in a police car toward Tulumayo when mines planted on the road exploded under them, destroying the car and instantly killing them. Their remains were brought to Lima last night and will be buried at El Angel cemetery tonight.

Police Seize Cocaine Processing Chemicals

PY2012134288 Lima Domestic Service in Spanish 1030 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] At the (Papilir) customs post, National Police personnel have seized 282 kg of sodium carbonate that was to have been used in the processing of cocaine. The chemicals were packed in 24 plastic bags that were hidden under foodstuffs in a truck.

A Salazar Company bus, driven by (Doming Arellanos), was stopped by police who seized 50 kg of sodium carbonate packed together with other products. The consignment was addressed to [name indistinct].

Those detained included: Pablo Cornelio Maijuan, Walter Ricardo Salazar, Tito Loide Garcia, Pedro Coio Valinas, and Vitaniel Bravo Saluderman.

Uruguay

Coffee Harvesters Brigade Leaves for Nicaragua

PY2012215588 Montevideo LA HORA in Spanish 10 Dec 88 p 17

[Text] The "Jose Artigas" Coffee Harvesters Brigade left for Nicaragua yesterday.

This brigade is made up of 15 young Uruguayan boys who will work for one month picking coffee, Nicaragua's main source of income.

These boys make up the fourth brigade to come from Uruguay. Since the departure of the first brigade in 1986, all of them have been recognized for their volunteer work. The brigade that left in January of this year has been praised for its outstanding work. Compared to the other brigades, they were second in the amount of coffee picked.

The aftermath of Hurricane "Joan" in Nicaragua forced the brigade to move their departure up one month. That forced the organizations participating in this endeavor to make a tremendous effort to obtain the resources necessary to buy the tickets for the brigade members.

Before their departure, they stated: "We members of the brigade will express the Uruguayan youth's solidarity with Nicaragua against the U.S. aggression and blockade."

The brigade is made up of representatives of the FEUU [Federation of Uruguayan University Students], the FES [Federation of High School Students], the Youth Commission of AEBU [Association of Uruguayan Bank Employees], the PIT-CNT Departmental Board of Canelones, the Uruguayan Socialist Youth (JSU), the Union of Communist Youth (UJC), the Party for the People's Victory, the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros Faction (MLN-T), and the Independent Democratic Left. Representatives of the Broad Front L and M [expansion unknown] Coordinating Boards, and a delegate of the J, Q, and N Coordinating Boards, will also travel with the brigade.

The brigade is scheduled to return on 9 January.

Referendum on Military Amnesty To Be Held

PY2012132288 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1746 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Text] Montevideo, 19 Dec (AFP)—Lawyer Alberto Perez Perez, secretary of the National Referendum Commission, today confirmed that the law that grants amnesty to members of the military who violated human rights will be suject to a referendum.

This demonstrates that the Uruguayan people are capable of doing outstanding things and we are now sure that the Law of Impunity will be abrogated, he added.

Perez Perez was the first commission member to confirm that the number of signatures (555,701) that the Constitution demands for the calling of a referendum had [words indistinct] to celebrate the victory after it was made known that the signatures needed to call a referendum to decide the amnesty issue for members of the military had been achieved.

The executive secretary of the PIT-CNT (Interunion Workers Plenum-National Convention of Workers) has stated that the workers must gather on 18 de Julio Avenue, Montevideo's main avenue, at 1600 (1800 GMT) [date not given].

He also stated that people who are working at that time must drop their work in order to participate in the demonstration.

Suriname

Bouterse: Rensch Force Behind Army Resistance

FL2012222888 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Text] Commander Bouterse has told the press that Stanley Rensch has been exposed as one of the forces behind the Army resistance. He then assured that many prominent figures in our society have supported the Brunswijk gang. Bouterse said that Brunswijk must be careful that his masters (?won't eliminate) him since a lot would be (?refuted) if Brunswijk decides to talk.

The Army commander says that peace in the east Suriname conflict could be reached soon. It's now, however, impossible to reach peace since promises have been made to the terrorists which are impossible to materialize.

Foreign Minister, Venezuelan Counterpart Meet

FL2012225588 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] The Surinamese Foreign Affairs Minister Edwin Sedoc and his Venezuelan counterpart German Nava Carrillo held discussions last (?Thursday) and Friday. They have held talks about, among other things, fisheries, trade, technical support, and finances. Both parties agreed on a joint commission to meet in Suriname in January to make a fisheries agreement between both countries operational. They have further decided to jointly tackle the illegal trafficking of drugs.

According to Minister Sedoc, Suriname has made some concrete proposals to Venezuela regarding the payment of debts. These proposals will be studied by Venezuela. Minister Nava Carrillo said that Venezuela is aware of

the socioeconomic problems of Suriname and that a solution will be found for the debt problem. The Venezuelan minister returned to his country last week Friday.

NDP Chairman on Leaders' Visit to Netherlands

FL2012233288 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 20 Dec 88

[Text] NDP [National Democratic Party] Chairman Jules Wijdenbosch said the recent visit of the three coalition leaders to Holland did not have any (?status). They have, as informal persons, held talks with former Dutch politicians while also no joint statement was issued. Wijdenbosch made these statements during a lecture on the visit of the coalition leaders to Holland. The politician said the community is being misled with regard to the result of the visit to Holland.

Wijdenbosch expressed that Holland will reallocate the 200 million guilders since Suriname will not have finished the long-term development program before April next year. The NDP chairman said that Suriname should reconsider requesting a verdict of the International Court on the development cooperation and its unilateral suspension by Holland in 1982.

Human Rights Commission Holds News Conference

FL2012235288 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Text] The OAS Human Rights Commission has not received any complaints about alleged violations of human rights [words indistinct] installation of the current government. This was stated by the chairman of the commission (Oliver Jackman) during a press conference on Friday [16 Dec] night. The OAS commission pays a visit as a continuation of three previous visits to our country. (Jackman) indicated that the government cooperated in the investigation of 10 cases.

The question of peace in the interior and the human rights for residents there were among the topics discussed. The delegation also held talks with the government about the authority of the military police to arrest citizens and the recent arrest of Stanley Rensch. The chairman of the Human Rights Commission stated, however, that he is not authorized to investigate human rights violations by the terrorist gang. The commission only discusses alleged violations by governments, according to (Jackman) last Friday.

The delegation of the Human Rights Commission leaves today and will present its report to the OAS.

Bouterse, Human Rights Commission Fail To Meet

FL2012214288 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Text] A meeting between Commander Bouterse and the OAS Human Rights Commission, which was scheduled for last Friday, did not take place. Commander Bouterse had invited the press to witness the discussions but the OAS commission disagreed. Bouterse said the press could witness the discussions since he had nothing to hide. The commander said the OAS commission is not objective since it only investigates human rights violations allegedly committed by the Army. But no one says anything about the murders committed by the terrorists, said Bouterse. He said the investigation by the OAS commission is part of a scenario in (?assuring) that the Army violates human rights. He (?quietly) noted that this is in an attempt to try high-ranking Army officials.